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Cost-Benefit Default Principles 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In an important but thus far unnoticed development, federal courts have created a new series of 
“default principles” for statutory interpretation, authorizing regulatory agencies, when statutes are unclear, 
(a) to exempt trivial risks from regulation and thus to develop a kind of common law of “acceptable risks,” 
(b) to take account of substitute risks created by regulation, and thus to engage in “health-health” tradeoffs, 
(c) to consider whether compliance with regulation is feasible, (d) to take costs into account, and (e) to 
engage in cost-benefit balancing, and thus to develop a kind of common law of cost-benefit analysis. These 
cost-benefit default principles are both legitimate and salutary, because they give rationality and sense the 
benefit of the doubt. At the same time, they leave many open questions. They do not say whether agencies 
are required, and not merely permitted, to go in the direction they indicate; they do not indicate when 
agencies might reasonably reject the principles; and they do not say what, specifically, will be counted as an 
“acceptable” risk or a sensible form of cost-benefit analysis. Addressing the open questions, this Article 
urges that the principles should ordinarily be taken as mandatory, not merely permissive; that agencies may 
reject them in certain identifiable circumstances; and that steps should be taken toward quantitative analysis 
of the effects of regulation, designed to discipline the relevant inquiries. An understanding of these points 
should promote understanding of emerging “second generation” debates, involving not whether to adopt a 
presumption in favor of cost-benefit balancing, but when the presumption is rebutted, and what, in 
particular, cost-benefit analysis should be taken to entail. 
 
 
   
“Courts should be reluctant to apply the literal terms of a statute to mandate pointless 
expenditures of effort. . . . Unless Congress has been extraordinarily rigid, there is likely a basis 
for an implication of de minimis authority to provide exemption when the burdens of regulation 
yield a gain of trivial or no value.”1 
 
“It seems bizarre that a statute intended to improve human health would . . . lock the 
agency into looking at only one half of a substance’s health effects in determining the maximum 
level of that substance.”2 
 
                                                 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School and 
Department of Political Science. I am grateful to Elizabeth Garrett, Robert Hahn, Eric Posner, and 
Richard Posner for helpful comments on a previous draft. 
1 Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360-61 (DC Cir 1979). 
2 American Trucking Association v. EPA, 173 F.3d 1027, 1052 (DC Cir 1999). 2  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
“It is only where there is ‘clear  congressional intent to preclude consideration of cost’ 
that we find agencies barred from considering costs.”3 
 
"In order better to achieve regulatory goals - for example, to allocate resources so that 
they save more lives or produce a cleaner environment - regulators must often take account of all 
of a proposed regulation's adverse effects, at least where those effects clearly threaten serious and 
disproportionate public harm. Hence, I believe that, other things being equal, we should read 
silences or ambiguities in the language of regulatory statutes as permitting, not forbidding, this 
type of rational regulation."4 
 
“The rule-implicit valuation of a life is high – about $4 million – but not so astronomical, 
certainly by regulatory standards, as to call the rationality of the rule seriously into question, 
especially when we consider that neither Hepatis B nor AIDS is a disease of old people. These 
diseases are no respecters of youth; they cut off people in their working years, and thus in their 
prime, and it is natural to set a high value on the lost years.”5  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Risks never exist in isolation. They are part of systems. For that reason, 
any effort to reduce a single risk will have a range of consequences, some of them 
likely unintended.  
 
If the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) increases security at 
airports, so as to make flying safer, it will also make flying less convenient and 
more expensive, and thus lead some people to drive instead.6 Flying is much 
safer than driving, and hence the FAA’s measures might increase the number of 
lives lost on balance. If noise levels are reduced at the Grand Canyon, so that 
people can enjoy the area in peace and quiet, air tourism there will have to be 
dramatically reduced, so that fewer people can enjoy the area at all.7 If the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration increases regulation of benzene, 
a carcinogenic substance, it might lead companies to use an unsafe and perhaps a 
less safe substitute; it might also decrease wages of affected workers, and 
decrease the number of jobs in the relevant industry. People who have less 
money, and who are unemployed, tend to live shorter lives -- and hence 
occupational regulation might, under certain circumstances, sacrifice more lives 
                                                 
3 Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (DC Cir 2000). 
4 Whitman v. American Trucking Associations (Feb. 27. 2001) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
5 American Dental Association v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 827 (7th Cir. 1993).  
6 See Robert W. Hahn, The Economics of Airline Safety, 20 Harv. . L. & Pub. Policy 791 (1997). 
7 Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455 (DC Cir 1998). 3  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
than it saves.8 Of course the unintended consequences of risk regulation might be 
desirable rather than undesirable – as, for example, where regulation spurs new 
pollution control technologies. 
 
Now consider the following cases: 
 
1.  The Clean Air Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to issue standards controlling any substance that “contributes 
significantly” to pollution problems in certain areas. EPA issues 
regulations governing relevant pollutants, but without considering the 
costs of compliance. Industries challenge the regulations on the ground 
that cost is a statutorily relevant factor.9 
 
2.  The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is 
asked to promote fuel economy in automobiles “to the extent feasible.” 
NHTSA issues fuel economy standards that are admittedly feasible, in 
the sense that no one doubts that they are technologically and 
economically possible. But the Coalition for Automobile Safety, a 
public interest organization, contends that the effect of the standards 
will be to lead manufacturers to produce smaller and more dangerous 
cars. The Coalition contends that NHTSA acted unlawfully in failing to 
take this effect into account.10 
 
3.  A federal statute requires the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration to regulate toxic substances “to the extent feasible.”11 
OSHA interprets this language to require it to consider whether the 
regulation is technologically feasible and whether it is “practicable,” 
economically speaking, for the industry to comply. OSHA imposes a 
regulation that is admittedly “feasible” under this test; but the statute 
cannot pass a cost-benefit test, because the benefits are low and the 
costs are high. Insisting that costs should be compared with benefits, 
industries subject to the regulation complain that it is unlawful.12 
                                                 
8 See Symposium, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8 J Risk and Uncertainty 5 (1994). 
9 Cf. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (DC Cir 2000) (finding cost a permissible factor for the 
agency to consider under a similar statute; Lead Industries v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (DC Cir 1980) 
(finding cost an irrelevant factor under  provisions governing national ambient air quality 
standards). 
10 See Competitive Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA, 956 F.2d 321 (DC Cir. 1992). 
11 29 USC 655(b)(5). 
12 ATMI v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).  4  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
  In which of these cases has the agency acted unlawfully? The question is 
of immense importance, both for regulatory policy and for the relationship 
between courts and agencies. One of my main purposes here is to demonstrate 
that federal law has now built a novel set of rules for statutory construction: the 
cost-benefit default principles. In brief, these principles (1) allow de minimis 
exceptions to regulatory requirements;  (2) authorize agencies to permit 
“acceptable” risks, departing from a requirement of “absolute” safety; (3) permit 
agencies to take account of both costs and feasibility; and (4) allow agencies to 
balance costs against benefits. Taken as a whole, the cost-benefit default 
principles are making a substantial difference to regulatory policy, both because 
of their effects in litigated cases and because of their systemic consequences for 
regulation.13  
 
Even when thus specified, however, the default principles raise many 
questions. For the most part, the cost-benefit default principles say what agencies 
are permitted to do. It is not clear whether  the default principles also mean that 
where statutes are ambiguous, agencies will be required to do any of these 
things. Nor do the principles give much indication of how agencies  permitting 
”acceptable” risks, or engaging in cost-benefit analysis, might be expected to 
proceed.  What does it mean to say that agencies are permitted to “consider” 
costs? Would it be unlawful for an agency to say that even very high costs are 
worth incurring? In what way should the monetary valuation of human life be 
constrained? What counts as an acceptable or de minimis risk? How should 
agencies deal with the interests of future generations?  
 
  However  these questions are resolved, there can be no doubt that the 
cost-benefit default principles have emerged as a central part of what amounts to 
the federal  common law of regulatory policy. Of course most of that common 
law, including the incipient federal common law of cost-benefit analysis, will 
emerge, and is emerging, from regulatory agencies, which have to decide how 
much to regulate, and why.14 Here agencies are the principal architects of what is 
                                                 
13 See Robert Percival et al., Environmental Regulation 425 (4th ed 2000). I discuss the relevance of 
the important decision in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, S. Ct. (Feb. 28, 2001), 
below. 
14 Hence, for example, different agencies have come up with different dollar figures by which to 
value statistical lives; this is a central part of agency-made common law of cost-benefit analysis. 
See the table in Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When 
Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1105, 1146 (2000). There are also striking variations in 
agency selection of discount rate, that is, the treatment of costs and benefits (such as lives saved) 5  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
unmistakably a form of common law. But courts will undoubtedly play an 
important role,15 and it is in the interaction between agencies and judges that 
binding law will emerge. Among my largest purposes here is to understand the 
nature of the cost-benefit default principles, their legitimacy, and their future 
content.16   
 
There is a still more general point in the background. The steady 
emergence of the cost-benefit default principles signals the impending 
conclusion, in all branches of government,17 of a “first generation” debate over 
whether  cost-benefit analysis is desirable.18 That debate appears to be 
terminating  with  a general victory for its proponents, in the form of a 
presumption in favor of their view (signaled above all, perhaps, by President 
Clinton’s substantial endorsement of cost-benefit balancing via Executive 
Order19).  The “second generation” debates raise difficult questions about how 
(not whether) to engage in cost-benefit analysis – how to value life and health, 
how to deal with the interests of future generations, how to generate rules of 
thumb to simplify complex inquiries, how to ensure that agencies do what they 
are supposed to do, how and when to diverge from the conclusion 
recommended by cost-benefit analysis, how to determine the roles of agencies 
and courts in contested cases. My identification and assessment of the cost-
benefit default principles is intended as a contribution to these “second 
generation” debates. An especially important “second generation” question is 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the future. See Comment, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 65 U Chi L Rev 1333, 1364-69 (1998) (documenting variations ranging from 2% to 10%). 
These issues are treated  below. 
15 See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (striking down agency 
regulation of asbestos under statute calling for cost-benefit balancing).  
16 It is important to see that many federal agencies do not comply with the apparent requirements 
of cost-benefit balancing in existing executive orders. Robert Hahn has shown that compliance is 
episodic and that a great deal needs to be done to systematize the process. See Robert W. Hahn et 
al., Empirical Analysis: Assessing Regulatory Impact Analysis: The Failure of Agencies To 
Comply With Executive Order 12866, 23 Harv J. L & PP 859 (2000). Here as elsewhere, there is a 
large difference between law on the books and law in the world. I do not attempt here to address  
the important issue of how to ensure compliance with principles that call for attention to costs 
and benefits. But judicial review of agency action can serve as a partial corrective  at least, 
ensuring that in the egregious cases, agency action will be held invalid for failure to comply with 
the principles. This point is discussed at several places below. 
17 Within Congress, see eg, 5 USC 1532, 1535; within the executive, see note supra. 
18 For discussion, see Symposium, 29 J. Legal Stud. 837 (2000); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs 
of Mythic Proportions, 106 Yale LJ 1981 (1998).  
19 See Executive Order 12866, 58 Fed Reg 51735 (1993). 6  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
when, if ever, the presumption in favor of cost-benefit balancing is rebutted. I 
attempt to make a start in answering that complex question. 
 
The Article is organized as follows. Part II traces the rise of cost-benefit 
default rules in federal law; it begins with the emergence of cost-benefit 
principles, outlines statutory formulations, and then elaborates the default rules. 
Part III explores the underlying considerations in some detail – what supports 
the use of default principles generally and these default principles in particular. 
In Part III, I address the general question when the presumption in favor of the 
principles might be rebutted. Part IV turns to the question whether agencies 
should be required to do what the cost-benefit default principles permit them to 
do. Part V deals briefly with a set of issues that an agency must address if it is 
going to engage in cost-benefit balancing. Part VI is a brief conclusion. 
 
 
II.  Considering and Not Considering Costs  
 
A.  From 1970s Environmentalism to the Cost-Benefit State? A Prefatory Note 
 
I will not attempt to resolve the broad question whether  cost-benefit analysis 
is a good idea, or whether  the many recent initiatives  in that direction should be 
approved or modified.20 But as background to an understanding of the cost-
benefit default principles, a brief discussion is in order. 
 
The rise of interest in cost-benefit balancing signals a dramatic shift from the 
initial stages of national risk regulation. Those stages  were undergirded by 
might be called “1970s environmentalism,” which placed a high premium on 
immediate responses to long-neglected problems, which emphasized the 
existence of problems rather than their magnitude, and which was often rooted 
in moral indignation directed at the behavior of those who created pollution and 
other risks to safety and health.21 Defining aspects of 1970s environmentalism can 
be found in the apparently cost-blind national ambient air quality provisions of 
the Clean Air Act22 and in statutory provisions requiring “the best available 
technology” without an assessment of either costs or benefits.23   
 
                                                 
20 For a range of perspectives, see Symposium, 29 J. Legal Stud. 837 (2000). 
21 See Bruce Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 13 Colum. J. Env. 
L. 171 (1988). 
22 42 USC 7409(b). 
23 See, eg, 33 USC 1311(b)(1)AA), 42 USC 7411(a)(1), 7412(d)(2), 7475(a)(4), 7502(c)(1). 7  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
No one should deny that 1970s environmentalism has done an enormous 
amount of good, helping to produce dramatic improvements in many domains, 
above all in the context of air pollution, where ambient air quality has improved 
for all major pollutants.24 Indeed, 1970s environmentalism appears, by most 
accounts, to survive cost-benefit balancing, producing aggregate benefits in the 
trillions of dollars, well in excess of the aggregate costs.25 EPA’s own estimates 
suggest that as a result of the Clean Air Act, there were no less than 184,000 
fewer premature deaths among people thirty years of age or older in 1990 – and 
also that there were 39,000 fewer cases of congestive heart failure, 89,000 fewer 
cases of hospital admissions for respiratory problems, 674,000 fewer cases of 
chronic bronchitis, and 850,000 fewer asthma attacks.26 EPA finds annual costs of 
air pollution control at $32 billion, hardly a trivial number, but less than 4% of 
the annual benefits of $1.1 trillion.27 Even if the EPA’s own numbers show an 
implausibly high ratio, significant adjustments still reveal benefits far higher 
than costs.28 
 
More generally, OMB has, for the last several years, engaged in a full 
accounting of the costs and benefits of regulation.29 In general, the report shows 
benefits in excess of cost. While the government’s own numbers should be 
discounted – agency accounts may well be self-serving – at least they provide a 
good place to start.30 In its 2000 report, OMB finds total regulatory benefits 
ranging from $254 billion to $1.8 trillion, with total costs ranging from $146 
billion to $229 billion, for net benefits ranging from $25 billion to $1.65 trillion.31 
A more disaggregated picture is also encouraging. In the transportation sector, 
the benefits range from $84 billion to $110 billion, with the costs from $15 billion 
to $18 billion, for net benefits of $66 billion to $95 billion.32 In the net benefits 
range from $9 billion to $12 billion. Much of the uncertainty stems from 
uncertainty about environmental benefits and costs, producing a range from $-73 
                                                 
24 See Economic Analyses at EPA 455-56 (Richard Morgenstern ed. 1998); Paul Portnoy, Air 
Pollution Policy, in Public Policies for Environmental Protection 77, 101-105 (Paul Portnoy and 
Robert Stavins eds 2000). 
25 Id. 
26 Portnoy, supra, at 102-03. 
27 Id. at 109. 
28 Id. at 113 (showing a benefit-cost ratio of 3 to 1). 
29 Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/index.html. 
30 For a good but sometimes dated overview, see Robert Hahn, What Do The Government’s Own 
Numbers Tell Us?, in Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved (Robert Hahn ed 1995). 
31 Id.; see 2000 report, charts, table 4. 
32 Id. 8  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
billion in net benefits to over $1.5 trillion in net benefits.33 For most government 
action, however, the benefits seem to exceed the costs.34 As especially good 
examples, consider the following regulations, all from recent years: 
 
Table 1: Good Cost-Benefit Ratios 
 
Regulation  2000 (net benefits 
in millions of 
dollars) 
2005 2010 2015 
Head impact 
protection 
310-370  1,210-1,510 1,210-1,510 1,210-1,510 
Conservation 
reserve program 
$1100  $1100 $1100 $1100 
Restriction on 
sale and 
distribution of 
tobacco 
9,020-9820 9,020-9820  9,020-10,220  9,020-9820 
Acid rain 
controls 
260-1900  260-1900 260-1900 260-1900 
Energy 
conservation 
standards for 
refrigerators 
330  330-360 510-580 440-500 
New surface 
water treatment 
50-1,200  50-1,200 50-1,200 50-1,200 
Emission 
standards for 
new highway 
heavy-duty 
engines 
0  110-1200 110-1200 110-1200 
Disposal of PCBs  136-736  136-736  136-736  136-736 
Particulates 
standard 
0 0    12,000-
113,000 
-20,000-
86,000 
 
 
But even though the overall picture is no cause for alarm, a closer look at 
federal regulatory policy shows a wide range of problems. Perhaps foremost is 
                                                 
33 See id. 
34 See id., table 5.  9  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
exceptionally poor priority-setting, with substantial resources sometimes going 
to small problems, and with little attention to some serious problems.35 There are 
also unnecessarily high costs, with no less than $400 billion being attributable to 
compliance costs each year,36 including $130 billion on environmental protection 
alone.37 OMB’s own report shows some disturbing numbers: For the next fifteen 
years, OSHA’s methylene chloride regulation will have annual costs of $100 
million and annual benefits of $40 million38; a regulation calling for roadway 
worker protection has benefits of $30 million, but equivalent costs; the cost-
benefit ratio for airbag depowering regulation seems bad, though there is 
uncertainty in the data39; EPA’s regulation for financial assurance for municipal 
solid waste landfills  has monetized benefits of $0, but costs of $100 million, and 
this is expected for the next fifteen years.40 By way of general illustration, 
consider the following table,41 all drawn from recent regulations: 
 
 
Table 2: Questionable Cost-Benefit Ratios 
 
Regulation 2000  (net 
benefits in 
millions of 
dollars) 
2005 2010 2015 
Exposure to 
methylene 
chloride 
-60    -60 -60 -60 
Roadway 
worker 
protection 
0 0 0 0 
Financial 
assurance for 
municipal 
solid waste 
landfills 
-100 -100 -100 -100 
                                                 
35 This is the theme of Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle (1995). 
36 Thomas Hopkins, The Costs of Federal Regulation, 2 J Reg and Soc. Costs 5, 25 tbl. 2 (1992). 
37 Paul Portney and Robert Stavins, Regulatory Review of Environmental Policy, 8 J Risk and 
Uncertainty 111, 119 n. 1 (1995). 
38 Id., table 12. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 10  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Pulp and 
paper effluent 
guidelines 
-150 to 0  -150 to 0  -150 to 0  -240 to 0 
Ozone 
standards 
0  -235 to 240  -840 to 1190  -9,200 to -1000 
Child restraint 
system 
-40 to 40  -40 to 40  -40 to 40  -40 to 40 
Vessel 
response 
plans 
-220 -220 -220 -220 
Nitrogen 
oxide 
emission from 
new fossil fuel 
fired steam 
generating 
units 
-57 to 29  -57 to 29  -57 to 29  -57 to 29 
 
These figures, drawn from regulations in a single year, show a less than 
coherent pattern of regulation, especially when Table 1 is put together with Table 
2. According to one study, better allocations of health expenditures could save, 
each year, 60,000 additional lives at no additional cost – and such allocations 
could maintain the current level of lives saved with $31 billion in annual 
savings.42 The point has been dramatized by repeated demonstrations that some 
regulations create  significant substitute risks43 -- and that with cheaper,  more 
effective tools, regulation could achieve  its basic goals while saving billions of 
dollars.44 
 
In these circumstances, the most attractive parts of the movement for cost-
benefit analysis have been rooted not in especially controversial judgments about 
what government ought to be doing, but instead in a more mundane search for 
pragmatic instruments designed to reduce the three central problems of poor 
priority-setting, excessively costly tools, and inattention to the unfortunate side-
effects of regulation. By drawing attention to costs and benefits, it should be 
                                                 
42 Tammy Tengs et al., Five Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost-Effectiveness, 15 
Risk Analysis 369 (1995). 
43 See John Graham and Jonathan Wiener, Risk vs. Risk (1995). 
44 See, e.g., A. Denny Ellerman et al., Markets in Clean Air (2000); Robert Stavins, Market-Based 
Environmental Policies, in Public Policies for Environmental Protection, supra, at 31, 35-55. 11  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
possible to spur the most obviously desirable regulations, to deter the most 
obviously undesirable ones, to encourage a broader view of consequences, and to 
promote a search for least-cost methods of achieving regulatory goals.45 Notice 
here that so defended, cost-benefit analysis is not only an obstacle to unjustified 
regulation; it should be a spur to government as well, showing that it should 
attend to neglected problems. If cost-benefit balancing is supported on these 
highly pragmatic grounds, the central question is whether that form of balancing 
is actually producing what can be taken as policy improvements by people with 
diverse views about appropriate policy.  
 
On these counts, the record of cost-benefit analysis, at least within the EPA, is 
generally encouraging.46 Assessments of costs and benefits has, for example,  
helped produce more stringent and rapid regulation of lead in gasoline; 
promoted more stringent regulation of lead in drinking water;  led to stronger 
controls on air pollution at the Grand Canyon and the Navaho Generating 
Station; and produced a reformulated gasoline rule that promotes stronger 
controls on air pollutants.47 In these areas, cost-benefit analysis, far from being 
only a check on regulation, has indeed spurred governmental  attention to 
serious problems.  
 
Cost-benefit analysis has also led to regulations that accomplish statutory 
goals at lower cost, or that do not devote limited private and public resources to 
areas where they are unlikely to do much good. With respect to asbestos, for 
example, an analysis of benefits and costs led the EPA to tie the phase-down 
schedules to the costs of substitutes, and also to exempt certain products from a 
flat ban.48 With respect to lead in gasoline and control of CFCs (destructive of the 
ozone layer), cost-benefit analysis helped promote the use of economic incentives 
rather than command-and-control regulation49; economic incentives are much 
cheaper and make more stringent regulation possible in the first place. For 
regulation of sludge, protection of farmworkers, water  pollution regulation for 
the Great Lakes, and controls on organic chemicals, cost-benefit analysis helped 
regulators produce modifications that significantly reduced costs.50 For modern 
government, one of the most serious problems appears to be, not agency use of 
                                                 
45 For many examples, see Economic Analysis at EPA (Richard Morgenstern ed. 1996). 
46 See id. 
47 See id. at 458. 
48 Id. at 458. 
49 Id. at 49-86; 131-169. 
50 Id. at 458. 12  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
cost-benefit analysis, but frequent noncompliance with executive branch 
requirements that agencies engage in such analysis.51 
 
Of course cost-benefit analysis is hardly uncontroversial.52 Insofar as both 
costs and benefits are being measured by the economic criterion of “private 
willingness to pay,” there are many issues. Poor people often have little ability 
and hence little willingness to pay; some people will be inadequately informed, 
and hence show unwillingness to pay for benefits that would make their lives go 
better53; and perhaps regulatory agencies should seek, not private willingness to 
pay, but public judgments, as expressed in public arenas.54  Society is not best 
taken as some maximizing machine, in which aggregate  output is all that 
matters. Sometimes a regulation producing $5 million in benefits but $6 million 
in costs will be worthwhile,  if those who bear the costs (perhaps representing 
dollar losses alone?) can do so easily, and if those who receive the benefits 
(perhaps representing lives and illnesses averted?)  are especially needy. 
 
In view of these problems, the strongest arguments for cost-benefit balancing 
are based, not only on neoclassical economics, but also on an understanding of 
human cognition, on democratic considerations, and on an assessment of the 
real-world record of such balancing.55 Begin with cognition: People have a hard 
time in understanding the systemic consequences of one-shot interventions.56  
Unless they are asked to seek a full accounting,  they are likely to focus on small 
parts of problems, producing inadequate  or even counterproductive  solutions.57 
Cost-benefit analysis is a way of producing that full accounting. Ordinary people 
also have difficulty in calculating probabilities, and they tend to rely on rules of 
thumb, or heuristics, that can lead them to make systematic errors.58  Cost-benefit 
analysis is a natural corrective  here.  Because of intense emotional reactions to 
                                                 
51 See Hahn, supra note. 
52 For a general challenge to quantification, see Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic 
Proportions, 106 Yale LJ 1981 (1998). 
53 See Adler and Posner, supra note. 
54 Many of these points are pressed in Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (1993). 
55 I attempt to develop this point in Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. 
Legal Stud. 1059 (2000). In the same vein, see Allan Gibbard, Risk and Value, in Values At Risk 
94-112 (Douglas MacLean ed 1986). 
56 See Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure (1994). 
57 Id. 
58 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heurisics and Biases, in 
Judgment unde Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and 
Amos Tversky eds 1982); Roger Noll and James Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive 
psychology for Risk regulation, 19 J. Legal Stud. 747 (1990). 13  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
particular incidents, people often make mistakes in thinking about the 
seriousness of certain risks.59 Cost-benefit balancing should help government 
resist demands for regulation that are rooted in misperceptions of facts.  
 
With respect to democracy, the case for cost-benefit analysis is strengthened 
by the fact that interest-groups are often able to use these cognitive problems 
strategically,  thus fending off regulation that is desirable, or pressing for 
regulation when the argument on its behalf is fragile.60 Here cost-benefit analysis, 
taken as an input into decisions, can protect democratic processes by exposing an 
account of consequences to public view.   With respect to pragmatic 
considerations, a review of the record suggests that cost-benefit balancing leads 
to improvements, not on any controversial view of how to value the goods at 
stake, but simply because such balancing leads to more stringent regulation of 
serious problems, less costly ways of achieving regulatory goals, and a reduction 
in expenditures for problems that are, by any account, relatively minor.61 
 
None of these points suggests that cost-benefit analysis is a panacea for the 
problems that I have identified. Everything depends on questions of 
implementation, and there are also hard questions about appropriate valuation, 
questions to which I shall return. Sometimes respect for rights, or concerns about 
irreversibility, justify a rejection of cost-benefit balancing.62 The central point is 
that cost-benefit analysis can be seen, not as opposition to some abstraction 
called “regulation,” and not as an endorsement of the economic approach to 
valuation, but as a real-world instrument, designed to ensure that the 
consequences of regulation are placed before relevant officials and the public as a 
whole, and intended to spur attention to neglected problems while at the same 
time ensuring that limited resources will be devoted to areas where they will do 
the most good. So understood, cost-benefit analysis promises to attract  support 
from a wide range of people with diverse perspectives  on contested issues – a 
promise realized in the apparently growing bipartisan consensus on some form 
of cost-benefit balancing in many domains of regulatory policy.63 An 
understanding of this consensus is an indispensable background for approaching 
the cost-benefit default principles. 
 
                                                 
59 See George Loewenstein et al., Risk As Feelings (forthcoming 2001). 
60 See Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. 
Rev. 683 (1999). 
61 See Economic Analysis at EPA 455-76. 
62 TVA v. Hill, 437 US 153 (1978). 
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B. Statutory  Terms 
 
My emphasis here will be on the relationship between these points and judge-
made default rules for statutory interpretation. But judge-made rules have 
considerable overlap with approaches taken explicitly by Congress, in statutes 
governing health, safety, and the environment.  In fact there is undoubtedly an 
interaction effect between statutes and judge-made law, with default principles 
emerging from statutory formulations and vice-versa.  Part of the argument for 
the cost-benefit default principles is that they do not reflect purely judicial 
polcymakng; those principles fit well with explicit enactments  in other areas of 
the law. In dealing with the role of benefits and costs, federal statutes tend to fall 
in the following categories. I order the statutes roughly in accordance with their 
treatment of cost-benefit balancing, beginning with those that most flatly reject it, 
and ending with those that unambiguously embrace it.   
 
1.  Flat bans on consideration of costs. Some statutes, exemplifying 1970s 
environmentalism,  appear to forbid any consideration of cost. Perhaps 
the most famous example is the Delaney Clause, which for a long period 
prohibited food additives that “induce cancer in man or animal.”64 In the 
face of that language, the government sought to permit additives that, 
while carcinogenic,  created only the most miniscule risks of cancer – 
lower risks, in fact than those that would come from eating one peanut 
with the FDA-permitted level of aflatoxins every 250 days, and much 
lower risks than come from spending about 17 hours every year in Denver 
(with its high elevation and radiation levels) rather than the District of 
Columbia.65  Nonetheless, the Delaney Clause was taken to forbid any 
form of balancing. 66  But a far more important example comes from the 
most fundamental provisions of the Clean Air Act, governing national 
ambient air quality standards.67 For a long time, the national ambient air 
quality standards set under that Act have been understood to be based on 
“public health” alone.68 The EPA’s judgment is to be grounded only in 
benefits; the cost of compliance is irrelevant.  
                                                 
64 21 USC 376(b)(5)(B). 
65 Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (DC Cir 1987). 
66 Id. 
67 42 USC 7409(b). 
68 Lead Industries v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (DC Cir 1980). See also Union Electric Company v. EPA, 
427 US 246 (1976) (holding that EPA may not consider economic and technological feasibility 
when approving or disapproving a state implementation plan). As noted, the issue is currently 
before the Supreme Court. See note supra. 15  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
2.  Significant risk requirements. An alternative formulation is to require the 
agency to address only “significant” or “unacceptable” risks. On this 
view,  risks that do not reach a certain level need not and perhaps may not 
be addressed. This is the prevailing interpretation of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act, under both the toxic substance provisions and the 
more general provisions of the Act.69 A requirement of a “significant risk” 
falls short of cost-benefit analysis in the sense that it is entirely benefits-
based; costs are irrelevant as such. Once benefits fall below a certain 
threshold, regulation is not required and in fact is banned.70 Once benefits 
rise above that threshold, regulation is permissible, even if the benefits 
seem low in comparison to the costs. 
 
3.  Substitute risks and health-health  tradeoffs. Some statutes require 
agencies to consider whether a regulation controlling one risk would, in so 
doing, create a substitute risk. If so, agencies are permitted to decline to 
regulate, or to regulate to a different point. These are clear statutory 
recognition of health-health tradeoffs, which arise when there are health 
concerns on both sides of the equation, from both more and less 
regulation.71 Many statutory “consideration” requirements72 have an 
unambiguous feature of this sort, for example by requiring agencies 
entrusted with reducing air pollution problems to take account as well of 
“non-air quality health and environmental  impacts.” The Toxic 
Substances Control Act similarly requires the EPA to take account of 
substitute risks.73 
 
4. Feasibility  requirements. Some statutes require agencies to regulate “to 
the extent feasible” or “achievable.”74  These expressions are far from 
transparent. But as generally understood, such statutes put the focus not 
on benefits but solely on costs, and on costs in a particular way: They 
forbid an agency from regulating to a point that is neither (a) technically 
                                                 
69 Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. API, 448 US 607 (1980); International Union, UAW v. 
OSHA, 37 F.3d 605 (DC Cir 1994). 
70 American Trucking Assn. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (DC Cir 1999), appears to endorse this view for 
regulation of air pollutants, on the theory that an interpretation that would allow the EPA to pick 
any point it chooses would violate the nondelegation doctrine.  
71 See John Graham and Jonathan Wiener, Risk vs. Risk (1995). 
72 42 USC 7429 (a) (2) (OSHA); 42 USC 300g-1(b)(4)(B) (Safe Drinking Water Act). 
73 Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
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feasible, because the relevant control technology does not exist, nor (b) 
economically feasible, because the industry cannot bear the cost without 
significant or massive business failures.75 The line between (a) and (b), 
usually treated as crisp and simple, is hardly that; whether a requirement 
is technically feasible will usually depend on the level of resources that are 
devoted to it. In practice, (a) and (b) therefore overlap in practice, with (b) 
serving as a separate category only on those occasions when even with 
massive use of existing resources, the technology cannot be brought into 
existence. Noteworthy here is the fact that while a significant risk 
requirement is entirely benefits-based, a feasibility requirement looks 
exclusively at the cost side of the equation. Such a requirement is a 
“block” of excessively expensive regulation. 
 
5. “Consideration”  requirements. A large number of statutes ask agencies to 
“take into consideration” various factors, including cost, in addition to the 
principal factor to which the statute draws the agency’s attention (such as 
clean air or water). The most common formulation, now standard, asks 
the agency to produce the “maximum degree of reduction” that is 
“achievable,” after “taking into consideration [1] the cost of achieving 
such emission reduction, and [2] any [a] non-air quality health and 
environmental impacts and [b] energy requirements.”76  The basic idea 
here is that the agency is supposed to qualify the pursuit of the 
“maximum” achievable  reduction by asking (a) whether the cost is 
excessive, (b) whether energy requirements would be adversely affected, 
and (c) whether the “maximum” requirement might create health and 
environmental harms by, for example, increasing water pollution though 
reducing air pollution. Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, EPA is 
similarly instructed to back away from the maximum feasible level if the 
benefits of the stricter standard “would not justify the costs of complying 
with the level.”77 
 
6. Cost-benefit  requirements. Several statutes ask agencies to balance costs 
against benefits, mostly through a prohibition on “unreasonable risks,” 
alongside a definition of “unreasonable” that refers to both costs and 
benefits. The most prominent examples are the Toxic Substances Control 
                                                 
75 452 US 490, 508-09 (1976); ADL-CIO v, OSHA. 965 F.2d 962, 980 (11th Cir 1992). 
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Act78 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.79 Here 
the agency is required to calculate  both costs and benefits and to compare 
them against each other. If the costs exceed the benefits, regulation is 
unacceptable. More recently, cost-benefit analysis is mandated by the Safe 
Drinking Water Act Amendments.80 While Congress has thus far resisted 
efforts to impose a cost-benefit “supermandate” calling for a general 
decision rule based on cost-benefit balancing,81 Congress has enacted 
legislation requiring assessment, and public disclosure, of costs and 
benefits of major regulations.82 OMB itself has been required to produce 
annual accounting of costs and benefits.83 
 
In the abstract, the distinctions among these kinds of provisions should be 
clear enough. A statute that calls for consideration of substitute risks does not 
require cost-benefit balancing, because it is more narrowly concerned to ensure 
that risks (generally to health) do not increase on balance; under a statute calling 
for health-health tradeoffs, it is irrelevant that costs as such exceed benefits. A 
statute that requires that regulations be “feasible” is ordinarily taken to entail no 
comparison between costs and benefits, but a cost-focused inquiry into what 
industry is able to do -- whereas a statute that regulates “significant risks” is 
ordinarily taken to entail no comparison between costs and benefits, but a 
benefit-centered inquiry into the magnitude of the risk to be addressed.  
 
Of course many open questions remain, and I will return to those 
questions in Part IV. Let us simply take this menu of options as the background 
for understanding the nature of the cost-benefit default rules.  
 
C.  The Default Rules Identified: An Overview 
 
If Congress has been genuinely clear, the legal issue is at an end. But statutory 
terms are frequently ambiguous (this is an initial difficulty), and sometimes an 
interpretive problem is created by general language that seems not to reflect 
                                                 
78 15 USC 2605 (a). 
79 7 USC 136a(a). 
80 42 USC 300g-1(b)(3). 
81 See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 Stan. L. 
Rev. 247 (1996). 
82 5 USC 1532, 1535 
83 See, eg, section  625 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1998, PL 105-
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anything like congressional consideration of the specific point at issue (this is a 
second difficulty). In the face of statutory uncertainty, cases provide support for 
each of the following principles. For some of the principles, the law is more 
developed than for others; but each of the principles is an identifiable part of 
contemporary public law. 
 
      -- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be permitted to 
make de minimis exceptions to statutory requirements, by exempting small 
risks from regulatory controls.84 
      -- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise,  agencies will be permitted to 
take costs into account in issuing regulations. In its current form, this 
principle means that where statutes are ambiguous, agencies will have the 
authority to consider costs as well as benefits.85  
      -- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be permitted to 
balance the health risks created by regulation against the health benefits 
created by regulation.86 
      -- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be permitted to 
decline to regulate past the point where regulation would be economically or 
technologically feasible.87 
      -- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be expected to 
balance costs against benefits in issuing regulations.88 
 
Now let us explore some details. 
 
D.  De Minimis Exceptions 
 
1. The basic idea. In a series of cases, the D.C. Circuit has developed a 
principle authorizing agencies to make de minimis exceptions to regulatory 
requirements. The initial case was Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy.89 There the agency 
banned acrylonitrile on the ground that it counts as a “food additive,” migrating 
in small amounts from bottle into drinks within bottles. The FDA concluded that 
the ban was justified on safety grounds, a conclusion that the court found 
inadequately justified. But what is more important in the case is the general 
language with which the court remanded the case to the FDA. The court stressed 
                                                 
84 See, e.g. Committee on Sensible Transportation, Inc. v. Dole, 826 F.2d 60 (DC Cir 1987).  
85 213 F. 2d 663 at XX. 
86 This principle appears to underlie American Trucking Association v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (1999). 
87 See NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (DC Cir. 1987). 
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that the agency had discretion to exclude a chemical from the statutory definition 
of food additives if “the level of migration into food . . . is so negligible as to 
present no public health or safety concerns.”90  
 
A related case presented the question whether  the EPA was permitted to 
make categorical exemptions under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
program of the Clean Air Act.91  Here the court spoke in more ambitious terms, 
showing considerable enthusiasm for de minimis exemptions. It announced that 
“[c]ategorical exemptions may be permissible as an exercise of agency power, 
inherent in most statutory schemes, to overlook circumstances that in context 
may fairly be considered de minimis. It is commonplace, of course, that the law 
does not concern itself with trifling matters, and this principle has often found 
application in the administrative context. Courts should be reluctant to apply the 
literal terms of a statute to mandate pointless expenditures.”92 In fact the court 
expressly connected this principle with the idea that the court should “look 
beyond the words to the purpose of the act” to avoid “absurd or futile results.”93 
Thus the court concluded, in its broadest statement on the point, that “most 
regulatory statutes, including the Clean Air Act, permit” de minimis exemptions 
upon an adequate factual showing.94  
 
Here, then, is an explicit recognition of agency authority to exempt de 
minimis risks from regulatory controls. The authority operates as a clear 
statement principle, no less but also no more: Where Congress has 
unambiguously banned such exceptions, agencies are bound, and may not create 
de minimis exemptions even in compelling circumstances.95 
  
In the same vein, consider Sierra Club v. Department of Transportation.96 
At issue there was a statutory requirement that the Secretary of Transportation 
refuse to approve the “use” of significant public park land unless “the program 
or project includes all possible planning to minimize the harm to the park . . . 
resulting from the use.”97 The statutory question was whether limited 
commercial jet landings in an airport in the Grand Teton National Park should 
                                                 
90 Id. at 955. 
91 Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (DC Cir 1979). 
92 Id at 359. 
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95 Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (DC Cir 1987). 
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qualify as a “use,” in the face of a reasonable agency finding that the increase in 
flights would not result in a “significant” change in noise. The court found that 
the term “use” should be understood to authorize de minimis exceptions.98 There 
are many decisions in the same vein.99 
 
2. The OSHA variation: requiring de minimis exceptions. A noteworthy 
variation on the basic idea of permitting de minimis exceptions can be found in 
the plurality opinion in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. API, known as 
the Benzene Case.100 What the plurality said represents a variation on the basic 
idea for two reasons. First, the plurality forbids the agency to regulate trivial 
risks; it goes well beyond permitting the agency to create exemptions. Second, 
the plurality’s substantive standard is phrased not in terms of de minimis 
exceptions to regulation, but of limiting regulation  to “significant” risks, and 
hence prohibiting regulation of risks not shown to be “significant.” The second 
difference might or might not be important, because it is not clear whether risks 
that do not qualify as “significant” should be treated as de minimis, though this 
does appear to be what the plurality had in mind. 
 
The central issue in the case was whether  OSHA had to show a 
“significant risk” in order to regulate a toxic substance (benzene in the case 
itself).  In arguing that it did not, the government pointed to the central 
provision, which said (and says) that in promulgating the relevant standards, the 
Secretary “shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent 
feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer 
material impairment of health or functional capacity, even if such employee has 
regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his 
working life.”101 The statute’s general definition of occupational safety and health 
standards said (and says) that these are standards “reasonably necessary or 
appropriate to provide safe or healthful places of employment.”102 
 
                                                 
98 Id. at 130; the case is expressly understood  in this way in Coalition on Safe Transportation v. 
Dole, 826 F.2d 60, 63 (DC Cir 1987). 
99 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 992 F.2d 337, 343-45 (DC Cir 1993); EDF v. EPA, 82 F3d 451 (DC 
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A straightforward interpretation of the statutory terms, urged by four 
justices on the Supreme Court, would seem to suggest that no significant risk 
need be shown.103 The key statutory language is the “no employee will suffer” 
phrase, which indicates that even if a toxic substance places only one or a few 
workers in jeopardy, OSHA must act to provide protection. Whatever  the 
meaning of the obscure general definitional clause (“reasonably necessary or 
appropriate”), the more specific provision, dealing with toxic substances, would 
appear to trump any contrary indications in the more general one. Nonetheless, a 
plurality of the Court rejected  OSHA’s argument to this effect and hence rejected 
OSHA’s interpretation of the statute.  
 
In holding that a “significant risk” must be shown, the plurality 
contended  that a contrary interpretation would defy common sense: “In light of 
the fact that there are literally thousands of substances used in the workplace 
that have been identified as carcinogens or suspected carcinogens, the 
Government’s theory would give OSHA power to impose enormous costs that 
might produce little, if any, discernible benefits.”104 Though the plurality left 
undecided the question whether  the agency must also show a reasonable 
proportion between costs and benefits, it is clear, from the passage just quoted, 
that the “significant risk” requirement was motivated partly by the desire to 
ensure some kind of proportionality between benefits and costs, on the theory 
that the requirement  serves to protect against the most egregious 
disproportions.105 
 
In American Textile Manufacturers’ Institute v. Donovan,106 however, the 
Court emphasized what it saw as the ordinary meaning of the word ”feasible” in 
order to hold that OSHA was not required to engage in cost-benefit balancing. In 
the Court’s view, the agency’s job is to ensure that all regulated risks are 
“significant.” Once a significant risk is shown, the agency is required to regulate 
to the point where compliance would no longer be “feasible,” in the sense of 
practicable.107 The fact that a regulation violated a cost-benefit test is neither here 
nor there. This holding raises many questions, to which I will return.108 For the 
moment the key point is that the Court’s interpretation of OSHA builds on the 
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idea that de minimis exceptions are permitted to reach a conclusion that 
insignificant risks may not be regulated at all. 
 
E. Consideration of Cost 
 
The presumption that agencies may “consider costs” has also emerged in 
a series of important cases within the D.C. Circuit. Consider three examples, 
 
At issue in Grand Canyon Air Coalition v. FAA,109 was an FAA regulation 
designed to reduce noise from airplanes over the Grand Canyon. The statute 
required “substantial restoration” of the “natural quiet,” which the FAA 
understood to require that the Park achieve  50% of the natural quiet at least 75% 
of the day. In refusing to impose stricter controls, the FAA explained that it took 
into “consideration of the needs of the air tour industry.”110 From its ambiguous 
explanation, it appears that the FAA sought partly to protect the air tour industry 
as such, but mostly to protect tourists in their ability to see the Grand Canyon 
from the air. Not surprisingly, the FAA had been asked to impose both more 
strict and less strict regulation, and its decision was contested, by different 
parties, as both too strict and as excessively lenient. 
 
Those challenging the rule said that the FAA’s task was to ensure 
“substantial restoration” of the “natural quiet,” and that protection of the air tour 
industry was a statutorily irrelevant factor.111 The court responded by invoking 
something like a presumption in favor of considering cost, noting that nothing in 
the statute “forbids the government from considering the impact of its regulation 
on the air tour industry.”112 The court’s passage is ambiguous, but it appears to 
be a recognition that in the face of congressional silence, at least one kind of cost 
– that involving the air tour industry -- will be within agency discretion to 
consider. The narrowest construction of the court’s opinion is that statutes 
should not be taken to be self-defeating, so that the FAA is permitted to conclude 
that a statute designed to enable people to enjoy the Grand Canyon, by reducing 
noise, should not be implemented with regulation so strict as to disable people 
from enjoying the Grand Canyon by the air.113 A broader reading is that under 
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ambiguous statutes, agencies will be presumed able to take into account the costs 
of various implementation strategies.114 
 
Support for the broader reading comes from George Warren Corp. v. 
EPA,115 where domestic companies challenged the EPA’s implementation of the 
reformulated gasoline provisions of the Clean Air Act. A central question for the 
EPA was how to treat foreign refiners and importers.  In resolving that question, 
the EPA considered not only air quality benefits, but also the comments of the 
Department of Energy (DOE). That agency expressed concern that certain 
approaches could increase the price and decrease the quantity of gasoline, by 
making it more difficult for foreign refiners to divert production to the United 
States in periods of increased demand.116 The EPA took this point expressly into 
account in its rule. The result was an outcome more favorable to foreign refiners, 
and less favorable to environmental protection or domestic competitors, than 
EPA might otherwise have chosen. Nonetheless, the court upheld the agency’s 
decision, emphasizing the absence of an explicit legislative  ban on consideration 
of these economic factors.117 The court appeared to suggest that an express 
congressional preclusion of economic factors would be necessary in order to 
make them irrelevant as a matter of law. 
 
By far the most explicit statement on point, however, comes from State of 
Michigan v. EPA.118 At issue there was an EPA decision to approve a state 
implementation plan (SIP) for the regulation of ozone. The statutory term 
provided that SIPs must contain provisions adequately prohibiting “any source 
or other type of emissions activity within the state from emitting any air 
pollutants in amounts which will . . . contribute significantly to nonattainment in, 
or interfere with maintenance  by, any other State with respect to any such 
national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard.”119 At first glance, 
this provision might well be read as a kind of absolute ban on “significantly 
contributing” pollutants. But the EPA did not understand it that way. Instead the 
EPA reached a more subtle conclusion:  The “significant contributors” would be 
required to reduce their ozone, but only by the amount achievable via “highly 
                                                                                                                                                 
interests of the air tour industry would not be self-defeating at all. Unfortunately there is no 
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114 This is how the case is read in Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.2d 663,  (2000). 
115 159 F.2d 616 (1998). 
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cost-effective controls,”120 meaning those that could produce large reductions 
relatively cheaply. In states with high control costs, then, relatively low 
reductions would be required.  
 
Apparently because of the clarity of the statutory language on the 
particular point, no one in the case argued that EPA was required to balance 
costs against benefits before issuing regulations. Challenging the EPA’s 
interpretation, environmental groups urged that the statute banned any 
consideration of costs at all. The court rejected the argument, finding no “clear 
congressional intent to preclude consideration of costs.”121 But the court 
obviously had a difficult time with the statutory terms “contribute significantly,” 
which seem to refer to environmental damage, not to environmental damage 
measured in light of cost. In upholding the EPA’s decision, the court insisted that 
significance should not “be measured in only one dimension,” that of “health 
alone.” In fact in some settings, the term “begs a consideration of costs.”122 In the 
court’s view, EPA would be unable to determine “’significance’ if it may consider 
only health,” especially in light of the fact that ozone causes adverse health 
effects at any level. If adverse effects exist on all levels, how can EPA possibly 
choose a standard without giving some weight to cost?123 
 
But there is a serious problem for this conclusion. Taken together, the 
OSHA cases seem to argue in the opposite direction. As we have seen, the 
requirement that OSHA show a “significant” risk (a requirement imposed in the 
Benzene Case) has not been taken to mean that OSHA must or even may 
consider costs (with cost-benefit balancing apparently banned by the Cotton 
Dust Case). To this the court responded that in the aftermath of those cases, 
OSHA has itself attempted to ensure, and invariably claimed, that the costs of 
safety standards are “reasonably related to their benefits.”124 In any case “the 
most formidable obstacle” to a ban on consideration of cost “is the settled law of 
this circuit,”125 which requires an explicit legislative statement to preclude 
consideration of cost. Here, then, is an express judicial endorsement of a cost-
benefit default principle, permitting agencies to consider costs if they seek to do 
so. 
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F. Substitute Risks 
 
Extensive attention has recently been given to the problem of “risk-risk” 
or “health-health” tradeoffs, which arise when regulation of one health problem 
gives rise to another  health problem.126 Suppose that more stringent fuel 
economy standards for new cars, justified partly on environmental and thus 
health-related grounds, would have the effect of leading automobile 
manufacturers to produce smaller and more dangerous cars, thus resulting in a 
significant loss of life in accidents.127 Is the agency entitled to take this effect into 
account? Or suppose that the FDA is asked to require genetically engineered 
foods to be labeled as such; if the labels would lead consumers to switch to less 
safe substitutes, such as organic foods,128 may the FDA take that effect into 
account? Or return to the case with which I began and suppose that the Federal 
Aviation Administration is asked to require children under the age of three to 
have their own seats in airplanes. The regulation might be urged on the ground 
that it would prevent a number of injuries in the air and also produce protection 
in the event of a crash. In the abstract, it is reasonable to think that children will 
be helped as a result. But suppose that a consequence of the mandatory purchase 
of a seat would be to lead many parents to drive rather than fly, on the ground 
that flying has suddenly become significantly more expensive. It is possible that 
the overall consequence of the proposed FAA rule would be that more children 
will die. Is the FAA permitted to take this effect into account?  
 
Recent cases suggest an emerging principle of interpretation, in the form 
of a strong presumption in favor of permitting (and even requiring) agencies to 
take account of substitute risks, and hence to undertake health-health tradeoffs. 
In American Trucking Association, for example, it was argued that while 
ground-level ozone creates certain health risks, it also produces certain health 
benefits, above all because it provides protection against skin cancer and 
cataracts.129 The EPA responded that it lacked authority to consider the risks 
created by regulation or (to put the point slightly differently) the health benefits 
of an air pollutant.130  
 
Taken on its own, the statutory text seemed to support the EPA’s view, or 
at least to make that view a reasonable interpretation of ambiguous terms. The 
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statute provides that ambient standards must be based on “criteria” documents, 
which are supposed to include “the latest scientific  knowledge useful in 
indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public health or 
welfare which may be expected from the presence of such pollutant in the 
ambient air, in varying quantities.”131  EPA urged, plausibly, that the phrase 
“identifiable effects” of “such pollutant” was meant to refer to the adverse effects 
of the “pollutant,” not to its beneficial effects.  But the court concluded that the 
statute could not be interpreted  in that way.132 In a passage that suggests a 
strong presumption in favor of health-health tradeoffs, the court said 
(unconvincingly) that the statute was unambiguous, and (far more convincingly) 
that “EPA’s interpretation fails even the reasonableness standard . . .;  it seems 
bizarre that a statute intended to improve human health would . . . lock the 
agency into looking at only one half of a substance’s health effects in determining 
the maximum level for that substance.”133 What is most striking about this 
suggestion is that the court seems to have gone beyond the view that the agency 
is permitted to engage in health-health tradeoffs if it chooses, and to require the 
EPA to do so even if it would chose otherwise. 
 
Or consider Competitive  Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA,134 where the 
plaintiffs challenged fuel economy standards precisely on the ground that the 
agency had failed to take account of the adverse effects of such standards on 
automobile safety. In the face of an ambiguous statute, the court insisted that a 
full explanation was required for a decision that, in the abstract, would seem to 
create  serious substitute risks.135 As a result of this decision, it is now the law 
that NHTSA must taken into account any evidence  of adverse safety effects in 
the process of setting fuel economy standards. On remand, NHTSA confronted 
the evidence and concluded that the alleged effect could not be demonstrated – a 
conclusion that the court upheld on appeal.136 What is important for present 
purposes is the clear holding that the agency is permitted and even obliged to 
consider health-health tradeoffs in setting fuel economy standards. 
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G. Feasibility 
 
Many statutes expressly require regulation to be “feasible.”137 But what if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous on the question whether  agencies may impose 
regulations beyond the point of “feasibility”? Sometimes statutes are 
“technology-forcing,” in the sense that they require companies to innovate,  and 
thus to do more than what current technology permits.138 Often, however, the 
technology that is ‘forced” by statutory requirements is entirely feasible, indeed 
that it part of the reason that Congress requires it.  In fact technology-forcing can 
be justified by cost-benefit principles themselves -- if the benefits of forcing 
technology outweigh the costs, as they sometimes do. Companies might fail to 
innovate with respect to pollution control simply because they do not internalize 
all of the benefits of the innovation. But technological innovation is sometimes 
neither feasible nor justified by cost-benefit principles. Because of large costs, 
regulation will sometimes raise serious questions from the standpoint of 
feasibility, in the sense that it will drive many companies out of business or 
require technologies that are not now and cannot soon be made available. Here 
the question is how to handle legislative silence. 
 
The question arose most prominently in NRDC v. EPA,139 involving the toxic 
substances provision of the Clean Air Act. That provision, since substantially 
revised,140 required EPA to issue regulations that would provide “an ample 
margin of safety to protect the public health.”141 The principal question was 
whether cost was relevant to the EPA’s judgment. On its face, the statute might 
seem to block any consideration of cost and indeed to require regulations that 
would reduce risks to zero, especially because for many toxic substances, safe 
thresholds simply do not exist.  Alert to this point, the EPA urged that it should 
be allowed to take feasibility into account in setting regulations. The court 
accepted this conclusion by suggesting that regulations could avoid “zero risk”  
in two ways. First, the EPA was required to make an initial, benefits-based, cost-
blind determination of what is “safe”; but citing the Benzene  case, the court said 
that “safe” did not mean “risk-free.”142 Thus “the Administrator’s decision must 
be based upon an expert judgment with regard to the level of emission that will 
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result in an ‘acceptable’ risk to health.”143 Of course there is a degree of 
arbitrariness in any particular judgment here, especially if the judgment is cost-
blind. But the court was apparently attempting to ensure a degree of visibility 
and consistency in agency decisions, by ensuring that the “acceptable risk” 
judgment would be made publicly, and would be adhered to in a range of cases.  
 
Second, the court said that in deciding how far to go beyond “safety,” in 
order to provide an “ample margin,” the Administrator was permitted to 
consider both costs and feasibility.144 It is clear that the court engrafted these 
ideas onto a statute that did not expressly include them. In this sense, the 
decision suggests an interpretive principle to the effect that a statute that is silent 
or ambiguous on the point will ordinarily be taken to permit the agency to take 
account of the feasibility of statutory commands. 
 
H. Costs and Benefits 
 
If the statute is ambiguous or silent on the point, will an agency be permitted 
to decide in accordance with cost-benefit balancing? Is an agency authorized to 
make such balancing the basis for decision?  
 
1. In general. An affirmative answer was given in NRDC v. EPA145 (the same 
title, but not the same case, as that just discussed). At issue there was the EPA’s 
decision whether to classify a source of fugitive emissions as “major” within the 
meaning of a statutory provision calling for regulation of “major emitting 
facilities.146 The EPA concluded that it would not add certain industrial sources, 
including surface coal mines, on the ground that the social and economic costs of 
regulation would outweigh the environmental benefits.147 The statutory language 
did not require cost-benefit analysis and the court emphasized that an alternative 
construction as not barred by statutory language and legislative history.148 
Nonetheless, the court said that it would treat the agency’s interpretation as 
permissible in the face of legislative silence. 
 
Interpretation of OSHA has showed identical thinking. Outside of the area of 
toxic substances, the statute (with its opaque “reasonably necessary or 
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appropriate” language)  is ambiguous on whether cost-benefit analysis may be 
made the basis for decision. Here a prominent court went out of its way to say 
that OSHA is permitted to decide on the basis of cost-benefit balancing if it 
wishes.149  In a challenge to the agency’s lockout/tagout rule, the court of appeals 
said that such balancing would be a permissible basis for agency decisions, and 
indeed seemed to suggest that this would be the court’s preferred route.150 On 
remand, the agency appeared to decline the court’s invitation, choosing a test 
based largely on a mixture of the “significant risk” and “feasibility” 
requirements, a test that the court upheld.151 But the story does not end there. The 
agency has continued to say – perhaps to insulate itself from a court challenge – 
that it finds a “reasonable relationship” between costs and benefits, and in its 
most recent pronouncement on the issue, the court treats this as an authoritative 
constructive of the statute.152 It remains to see whether an OSHA regulation that 
is said not to show such a reasonable relationship might be challenged as 
unlawful. 
 
2. The TSCA wrinkle. A more aggressive ruling, with a statutory text more 
favorable to cost-benefit balancing, is Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA.153 What 
makes this a wrinkle is that as in the Benzene case, the court said not merely that 
the agency is permitted to follow an interpretive principle, but that it is required 
to do so. At the same time, the Corrosion Proof Fitting court’s decision is the 
most elaborate statement to date of the emerging federal common law of cost-
benefit analysis. 
 
At issue was the EPA’s attempted ban on asbestos, an admittedly 
carcinogenic substance, under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).154 TSCA 
allows EPA to regulate “unreasonable risks,”155 and it therefore invites some kind 
of cost-benefit balancing. But the court went far beyond what the statute 
unambiguously invited. In addition to allowing EPA to engage in cost-benefit 
balancing, the court required a high degree of quantification from EPA, 
including explicit comparisons of the cost-benefit ratios for different degrees of 
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regulation, and also separate discussions of how regulation would affect 
different industries using asbestos.156 The court thus insisted that the EPA go 
beyond a comparison of “a world with no further regulation” and “a world in 
which no manufacture of asbestos takes place” to include as well cost-benefit 
comparisons under different approaches to regulation.157  
 
At the same time, the court objected, not to the overall cost-benefit  ratio, but 
to the cost-benefit ratios for some areas in which  asbestos was to be banned: 
“[T]he agency’s analysis results in figures as high as $74 million per life saved. 
For example, the EPA states that is ban of asbestos pipe will save three lives over 
the next thirteen years, at a cost of $128-277 million (343-76 million per life saved) 
. . .; that its ban of asbestos shingle will cost $23-34 million to save 0.32 statistical 
lives ($72-106 million per life saved); that its ban of asbestos coatings will cost 
$460181 million to save 2.22 lives ($14-54 million per life saved) . . .”158   With 
evident incredulity, the court sad that the “EPA would have this court believe 
that Congress .  . . thought that spending $200-300 million to save approximately 
seven lives (approximately $30-40 million per life) over thirteen years is 
reasonable.”159 All in all, this is an exceptionally aggressive use of the interpretive 
principle in favor of cost-benefit balancing. The court not only construes 
statutory text in a way that mandates such balancing, but also requires a 
demonstration that particular parts, and subparts, of the relevant regulation 
satisfy a cost-benefit inquiry.160 
 
I.  A Note on American Trucking 
 
In a sense, the cost-benefit default principles were tested before the Supreme 
Court in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations.161 In that case, the Court 
was asked to say that the EPA could consider costs in setting national ambient air 
quality standards. The Court refused the invitation, concluding that such 
standards must be set without regard to cost. The Court emphasized the evident 
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clarity of the statutory provision at issue, which defined national standards as 
those “requisite to protect the public health.”162 In context, the reference to 
“public health” seemed to require a cost-blind judgment, based on health alone. 
 
Does American Trucking throw the cost-benefit default principles into doubt?  
The simple answer is that it does not. The Court concluded that the Clean Air Act 
was unambiguous; it did not by any means suggest that an ambiguous statute 
would be taken to disallow consideration of costs. In his separate opinion, Justice 
Breyer was careful to say that courts “should read silences or ambiguities in the 
language of regulatory statutes” to permit consideration of “all of a proposed 
regulation’s adverse effects,” at leas where those effects would clearly be serious 
and disproportionate.”163 Justice Breyer was clearly concerned that the Court’s 
approach would permit consideration of costs only where Congress had been 
explicit on the point. But at first glance, Justice Breyer’s concern seems baseless. 
The Court was saying only that in view of the clarity of the main provision of the 
Clean Air Act, judges would be reluctant to find permission to consider costs 
elsewhere, since Congress “does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory 
scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions – it does not, one might say, hide 
elephants in mouseholes.”164 This is a standard approach to statutory 
interpretation. It does not suggest that where a statute’s “fundamental details” 
are vague,  they will be interpreted to forbid consideration of cost. 
 
But it would be possible to read the Court's opinion a bit more broadly. The 
Court seems to suggest that a statute should not be taken to confer broad 
discretionary authority on agencies: “We find it implausible that Congress would 
give to the EPA through these modest words the power to determine whether 
implementation costs should moderate national air quality standards.”165 To 
support the view that American Trucking is best taken to disallow agencies to 
interpret ambiguous statutes to allow consideration of costs, it would be 
necessary to make a simple, two-step argument. First: Statutes should be 
construed so as to give agencies less rather than more in the way of discretion. 
Second:  A construction of a statute that would allow agencies to decide whether 
to consider costs significantly increases agency discretion. Now the claim here is 
not that a statute requiring cost-benefit analysis is itself disfavored on delegation 
grounds. The claim is instead that an interpretation should be disfavored if the 
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consequence of the interpretation would be to authorize the agency to decide 
whether to engage in cost-benefit balancing. If this claim is accepted, then the 
default rule in favor of allowing agencies to consider costs stands as repudiated.  
 
This may be the concern that animates part of Justice Breyer's concurring 
opinion. Justice Breyer urges that "In order better to achieve regulatory goals - 
for example, to allocate resources so that they save more lives or produce a 
cleaner environment - regulators must often take account of all of a proposed 
regulation's adverse effects, at least where those effects clearly threaten serious 
and disproportionate public harm. Hence, I believe that, other things being 
equal, we should read silences or ambiguities in the language of regulatory 
statutes as permitting, not forbidding, this type of rational regulation."166 Justice 
Breyer is clearly saying that in the face of statutory ambiguity, agencies should 
be allowed to consider costs, if only because that approach would increase the 
likelihood of rational regulation.  
 
But it is most unlikely that the Court would disagree with him. Agencies are 
typically allowed to interpret statutory ambiguities,167 and in countless cases in 
which that principle is invoked, the agency exercises a great deal of discretion 
over basic issues of policy and principle.168 To allow an agency to decide to 
consider costs is not to allow it to exercise more discretion than it does in 
numerous cases. For reasons discussed below, I believe that agencies should 
ordinarily be required, not merely permitted, to take costs into account, because 
it is most reasonable to assume that this is what Congress sought.169 But where 
the statute is unclear, agencies should be authorized to seek “rational 
regulation”; and nothing in American Trucking suggests otherwise. This is 
especially so in light of the fact, emphasized by both the Court170 and Justice 
Breyer,171 that the Clean Air Act allows EPA to consider costs at numerous stages 
in the implementation process. 
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III. Underlying Considerations 
 
What are the foundations of the cost-benefit default principles? What is 
their rationale?  Though the various default principles should be evaluated  
separately, there are common concerns in the background. We begin with 
statutory interpretation  in general. 
 
A.  Ambiguity, Absurdity, and Excessive Generality  
 
1. Three kinds of default principles. There is nothing new or unusual about 
default principles for statutory interpretation. They are ubiquitous. In fact they 
are inevitable.172 Language has no meaning without default principles of many 
kinds; everyone uses them every day. Generally such principles are agreed-upon, 
so much so that they do not seem to be principles at all. They are part of what it 
means to understand the relevant language. They need not even be identified, 
much less defended. But sometimes the principles are contested, or at least 
subject to contest, and in such cases, they must certainly be identified and 
defended, and the fact that they are being used is obvious to all. 
 
We might distinguish three circumstances here.  
 
      -- The simplest cases involves genuine ambiguity, in the sense that without 
resort to an identifiable default principle, courts really do not know what the 
statutory term means. Here the default principle will operate as a tie-breaker, 
authorizing an agency to act when the case is otherwise in equipoise. The use 
of default principles is uncontroversial in such cases; without some such 
principles, cases cannot be decided. 
        
      -- Less simple cases involve texts that are most naturally or easily taken to 
forbid the agency action, but when there is nonetheless ambiguity. Here the 
default principles are serving as “clear statement” principles – suggesting that 
the statute will be understood to allow the agency to do what it seeks unless 
Congress expressly says otherwise. This is of course a more aggressive use of 
default principles, pushing statutes away from the disfavored terrain. It 
appears to be the law, for example, that agencies will be allowed to consider 
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costs unless Congress expressly prohibits them from doing so;173 this is a clear 
statement principle, used not only when courts are in equipoise. 
 
      -- The third and most complex cases involves the sort of interpretive problem 
that might be understood to involve excessive generality.  This is the kind of 
problem found when, for example, a statute saying “no vehicles in the park” 
is applied to a war memorial consisting of a tank used in World War II,174 or 
when a nephew who has murdered his uncle seeks to inherit under a will that 
has not been revoked.175 In many legal systems, courts will look behind the 
language of the statute to prevent an outcome that makes no sense and that 
could not possibly have been intended.176 This was the court’s suggestion 
about the de minimis exception in Alabama Power, 177 and the court’s 
requirement that EPA consider health-health  tradeoffs was clearly 
understood in similar terms, as an effort to prevent an outcome that would be 
“bizarre” and hence that Congress could not have wanted.178 
 
2. Sense vs. nonsense. These are the circumstances for using default 
principles.179 But what is the appropriate content of such principles? This is a 
large question, and it makes sense to begin with established understandings.  
 
Where meaning is not clear, many time-honored principles are designed 
to give sense and rationality the benefit of the doubt. An old interpretive  
principle, with roots in almost all legal systems,180 counsels courts to avoid 
“absurdity”; sometimes this principle has been taken into to override statutory 
language.  More particular principles, of considerable current importance, 
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disfavor retroactivity181; require Congress to speak clearly if it seeks to create 
exemptions from the antitrust law; give the benefit of the doubt to Native 
Americans; and say that agencies will not, on their own, be taken to have the 
authority to apply statutes outside the territorial boundaries of the United 
States.182 It was probably inevitable that confronted with a wide range of 
regulatory enactments, courts would eventually develop a set of analogues for 
the regulatory state – principles that give rationality and sense the benefit of the 
doubt in the particular  context of contemporary regulatory law.183  
 
Each of the cost-benefit default principles is best defended on just this 
ground -- that they do give sense and rationality the benefit of the doubt and that 
Congress should not be taken to have mandated irrationality or absurdity. On 
this count, some of the default principles should be less controversial than others. 
At the very least, it seems sensible to say that agencies are permitted to ignore 
trivial risks and to balance the health benefits of regulation against te health costs 
of regulation. Where Congress has left things unclear, agencies should have 
discretion to move statutes away from (what they reasonably consider to be) the 
domain of senselessness. Notice that defended in this modest way, the cost-
benefit default principles combine substantive ideas about regulatory policy with 
institutional ones, in the form of a posture of judicial deference, allowing 
agencies room to maneuver.184 Because agencies are specialized in the topic at 
hand, and because they have a degree of political accountability, they are 
permitted to do what the cost-benefit default principles authorize. If agencies 
choose to do otherwise, there is, on the rationale as stated, nothing wrong with 
that.  
 
But we should acknowledge here that it is possible to discern two 
different strands in the cases establishing the cost-benefit default principles. Call 
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the first strand antiregulatory, and the second strand technocratic . On the 
antiregulatory  strand, the principles are best seen as an effort to block 
regulation,185 perhaps on the theory that regulation is frequently illegitimate from 
the standpoint of liberty, perhaps on the ground that it usually does more harm 
than good. The antiregulatory strand links the principles with those prevailing in 
the discredited Lochner era,186 where courts used both constitutional and 
interpretive principles  to limit regulation. By contrast, the technocratic strand 
embodies no animus against regulation as such. It is neutral on that question, 
assessing regulation only on the basis of what the data show. Indeed, it sees cost-
benefit analysis as a frequent impetus to regulation, as in the phaseouts of lead 
and CFCs.187 For technocrats, the impetus toward cost-benefit analysis is as much 
a check on insufficient regulation as it is a limitation on excessive controls. 
 
To the extent that the cost-benefit principles are approved here, it is 
because and to the extent that they embody the technocratic strand, enlisting 
policy analysis in the service of better regulation. The  antiregulatory form is 
illegitimate, a form of judicial hubris. But it should not be denied that both 
strands are playing a role in the cases. Let us now investigate  some details. 
 
B.  De Minimis Exceptions and Acceptable Risks 
 
The idea that agencies may make de minimis exceptions is an outgrowth 
of the old idea, de minimis non curat lex. If the risk at issue is tiny, the agency is 
not required to eliminate it. Much of the rationale here is a kind of implicit cost-
benefit balancing. If regulation occurs, both private and public resources will 
have to be expended in order to ensure compliance.  When the benefits of 
regulation are trivial, the agency is permitted to refuse to regulate, on the ground 
that the costs are likely to outweigh any benefits.188 When the benefits of 
regulation are trivial, no one is likely to have anything to complain about if 
regulation is foregone. Those who are attempting to complain are likely to be 
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well-organized private groups with a self-interested agenda, unrelated to the 
purposes for which the statute was enacted.189 
 
This understanding has the virtue of helping to account for the courts’ 
otherwise puzzling refusal to allow EPA to make a de minimis exception under 
the color additive  provisions of the Delaney Clause.190 Perhaps these decisions 
are best attributed to the fact that the statutory terms seem quite unambiguous. 
But as one court emphasized, it is unclear if significant costs are actually created 
by a decision to ban color additives.191 While the benefits of a ban are low, the 
costs are, in the particular circumstances, low as well. If the costs of regulation 
are trivial, perhaps a trivial gain from regulation is justified too. The general 
point is that trivial risks are unlikely to be worth private and public resources, 
they need not be controlled unless Congress has explicitly said that agencies 
must control them. 
 
C. Health-Health  Tradeoffs   
 
In a way the idea of “health-health tradeoffs” is the simplest of all. If 
agencies are imposing health risks at the same time that they are protecting 
health, they should, at the very least, be permitted to take this fact into account. 
What most matters, after all, is whether risks are being reduced on balance 
(though distributional and equitable concerns can complicate this claim, as 
discussed below). Other things being equal, it is hardly desirable for government 
to reduce the respiratory risks of ground-level ozone if ground-level ozone also 
provides significant protection against cancer and cataracts.192  The agency 
should be permitted to ask whether this is what it should do, subject to review 
for reasonableness.  
 
Now this does not mean that a sensible legislature will inevitably ask 
agencies to compare health risks with health benefits. Perhaps an institutional 
division of labor is sought, so that some agencies deal with some risks, whereas 
other agencies attend to others.193 It is imaginable, for example, that an agency 
entrusted with promoting fuel economy is not supposed to consider safety 
issues, which are a province of another institution. At least if the two agencies 
are not working at cross purposes, and are engaged in some effort at 
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coordination, it is possible that this division of labor makes sense. The only claim 
is that when an agency is aggravating one health problem while it is resolving 
another, it ought to be permitted to take that factor into account unless Congress 
has said otherwise. In any case permission to engage in health-health balancing 
helps counteract the constant risk of tunnel vision on the part of regulators. 
 
At this stage it might be asked why, to many people, health-health 
analysis seems so much less controversial than cost-benefit analysis. Many 
people seem skeptical of the idea that costs should be balanced against lives 
saved194; but few people are skeptical of the idea that lives saved should be 
balanced against lives lost. The simplest explanation is that people have a great 
deal of difficulty in trading off life against dollars, not only cognitively but also 
morally, and the very idea of ascribing an explicit monetary value to a 
(statistical) life remains controversial.195  When people are asked to weigh health 
against health, the mental operation is far less troublesome. People generally 
agree that agencies should attempt to save more lives on balance, rather than 
fewer. Note that this is a descriptive point about how people tend to think, 
intended to help explain what might seem to be an anomaly; it is not a normative 
point at all. 
 
D.  Costs, Feasibility, and Costs vs. Benefits  
 
Why are agencies presumptively entitled to consider costs?. The basic idea 
must be that a “benefits only” approach also reflects a kind of tunnel vision, a 
myopic focus on only one of the variety of things that matter.  Suppose, for 
example, that one approach to regulation would produce a certain level of air 
quality benefits, but do so at a cost of $800 million – and that another competing 
approach would produce a very slightly lower level of air quality benefits, but do 
so at a cost of $150 million. If costs can be made relevant, the agency is permitted 
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to do what seems quite sensible: to save the $650 million on the ground that the 
benefits of the expenditure would not be high enough to justify the expenditure.  
 
Of course it would be necessary to know a great deal more to know how 
to evaluate the particular problem.  If the $650 million would mean a significant 
loss of jobs, and if the lower air quality benefits would not result in significant 
mortality or morbidity effects, it seems most sensible not to expend the 
resources. But if the $650 million would mean slightly reduced profits for 
producers, or slightly increased prices for a dispensable good, and if the air 
quality benefits would mean a nontrivial reduction in respiratory problems for 
tens of thousands of asthmatics, the case for more stringent regulation is far 
stronger. The point is not that a bare accounting of costs and benefits tells 
officials all of what they need to know.196 It is only that a sensible agency is 
entitled to, and does, “consider” the costs of regulation. Congress should not be 
understood to have banned agencies from doing this.  If Congress has a 
particular reason to require otherwise, it is permitted to do exactly that. 
 
Ideas of this sort help support the closely related idea that agencies are 
presumptively permitted to compare costs against benefits, and also to consider 
whether compliance is feasible.197 As we will see in more detail, the feasibility 
constraint is both ambiguous and from the normative perspective somewhat 
crude, because there is no identifiable point at which regulation becomes “not 
feasible.” But a feasibility constraint, crude though it is, can be defended in the 
same basic way as the presumption against mandatory control of insignificant 
risks: If compliance is not feasible, there is a good chance that regulation is not 
worthwhile. The least that can be said is that if regulation is so costly that it 
would force many companies to go out of business, with inevitable adverse 
effects for workers, the agency ought to have a very strong reason for imposing 
it. 
 
V.  Agency Permission versus Agency Requirements 
 
Thus far we have seen what agencies are permitted to do, if Congress is 
silent on the point. But it is necessary to distinguish between cases in which an 
agency attempts to do what cost-benefit principles permit and cases in which an 
agency refuses to do what courts are permitting. We know that for the agency, 
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no legal problem will arise in the first set of cases. What about the second? Might 
the default principles sometimes require agencies to follow a particular course? 
 
A. The Framework 
 
To answer this question, some brief background is in order. Chevron v. 
NRDC,198 the dominant case in the area, sets out the familiar two-step  inquiry for 
judicial review of agency decisions. The first question (“step one”) is whether 
Congress has “directly decided the precise question at issue” – more simply, 
whether Congress has unambiguously banned what the agency proposes to 
do.199 Under Chevron, agencies are generally permitted to construe ambiguous 
statutes as they see fit. It follows that even without a cost-benefit default 
principle, agencies should be permitted to consider costs so long as the statute is 
ambiguous on the point. When Chevron is combined with the default principle, 
the overall lesson is exceedingly straightforward: Agencies are permitted to 
consider costs when Congress has not said that they may not.  
 
Under Chevron, however, the issue is not finished upon a finding that 
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue. It remains to 
ask whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable (“step 
two”).200 When the American  Trucking Association court held that the EPA was 
required to consider the benefits as well as the risks of a pollutant, it did so partly 
on the ground that the agency’s interpretation to the contrary was not reasonable 
(because it was, in the court’s view, “bizarre”201). It is therefore possible that even 
if an agency’s decision does not violate Chevron step one (because the statute is 
ambiguous), it will nonetheless violate step 2, if the decision can be shown to be 
arbitrary or “bizarre.” 
 
B. The Framework Applied 
 
  Suppose that the agency has refused to allow a de minimis exemption, or 
engage in health-health comparisons, or to consider costs when the statute allows 
it to do so. If the agency has refused to do what the cost-benefit principles  
permit it to do, the analysis would proceed in the following steps.  
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1. The first question would involve Chevron step one: Has EPA violated 
unambiguous congressional instructions, or transgressed some judgment made 
“directly” by Congress? At first glance, the answer, by hypothesis, will be No. 
The statute is ambiguous rather than clear. The only possible response is that the 
cost-benefit default rule now operates as a kind of canon of construction, serving 
as part of the inquiry in Chevron step 1.  
 
The argument is unquestionably adventurous, but not as much so as it 
might appear. Many canons of construction now work in precisely that way.202 
Consider, for example, the following canons:  statutes will not be understood to 
apply outside the territorial borders of the United States203; statutes will not be 
understood to apply retroactively204; statutes will not be taken to raise serious 
constitutional questions.205 In all these cases, agency interpretations do not 
prevail under Chevron step 1, not because Congress has expressed its will 
clearly, but because Congress is required to speak with clarity if it wishes 
agencies to act in the way that they seek. Perhaps the cost-benefit default 
principle should be understood in similar terms.  
 
This is indeed possible, but it would require a significant stretch from 
existing law. The canons discussed above have a degree of longevity, indeed a 
straightforward justification  from longstanding traditions.206 The cost-benefit 
default principles have not yet acquired the status of the canons of construction  
that operate as part of Chevron step 1. It is therefore exceedingly doubtful that an 
agency’s refusal to proceed in the manner suggested by the cost-benefit default 
principles would be struck down under step 1.207 
 
2. The second question would involve Chevron step 2: Is the agency’s 
interpretation of the statute “reasonable”?  I suggest that the foregoing 
considerations, supporting the default rules in general, suggest the basis for a 
particular presumption: The agency’s interpretation is to be presumed 
unreasonable if it interprets the statute to fail to make de minimis exemptions,  to 
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disallow health-health  tradeoffs, not to consider costs or feasibility, to regulate 
insignificant risks, or to ban cost-benefit balancing.208 Of these various 
possibilities, the presumption of unreasonableness is strongest when the agency 
is attempting to regulate a de minimis risk or refusing to consider health-health 
tradeoffs. In such cases, the agency’s decision seems most obviously 
unreasonable. Why should expenditures be required for trivial risks? Why 
should the agency be permitted to increase overall risks? These questions do not 
have obvious answers.  
 
The argument that agencies would be unreasonable to reject the other 
default principles is less clear. But even in such cases, any reasonable judgment 
will ordinarily be based on some kind of weighing of costs and benefits, and not 
on an inquiry into benefits alone.209 Return to Michigan v. EPA, and suppose that 
in some states, the costs of reducing the “significant contribution” would be 
exceedingly high, whereas the benefits would be low, in light of the fact that the 
risks associated with the relevant concentrations of ozone are not severe. If the 
costs would be high and the benefits low, on what rationale should be the EPA 
refuse even to consider the former? Here too there appears to be no good answer. 
 
Notice that what is involved here is a presumption only, and it is 
rebuttable. It is possible to imagine agency explanations  that would show why 
its view – to reject one or another of the cost-benefit default principles -- is 
reasonable. It is that question to which I now turn. 
 
C. Rebutting the Presumption 
 
In several contexts, Congress, as well as agencies and courts, could 
reasonably find the default principles inapplicable.  The following catalogue is 
intended to identify circumstances in which agencies might sensibly decide not 
to go in the direction suggested by the default principles – and also in which a 
reasonable legislature might ban agencies from going in that direction. 
 
1.  Regulating de minimis risks: the case of low benefits and 
administrative difficulties.  Suppose that an agency has discretion to 
interpret the relevant statute so as to allow exemptions of de minimis 
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risks for (as an illustration) carcinogenic color additives in food. 
Suppose that the agency refuses to interpret the statute this way, 
because (a) the benefits of color food additives are generally low 
(noncarcinogenic  color additives will do about as well), (b) as a matter 
of science, it is not always simple to distinguish between weak and 
strong carcinogens, and (c) a flat rule will be simpler to administer. At 
least at first glance, this sort of explanation seems fully reasonable. It 
would distinguish the case from one in which the agency attempts to 
interpret the OSHA statute in such a way as to call for costly regulation 
of insignificant risks. 
 
2.  Regulating risks that might or might not be de minimis: the case of 
scientific ignorance.  Suppose that the agency attempts to regulate 
risks that (it agrees) cannot be shown to be significant. Suppose that it 
contends not that it will understand the statute to cover demonstrably 
insignificant or demonstrably de minimis risks, but instead to cover 
instead risks that, in light of existing scientific information, might be 
small but might be large -- a distinction that cannot be made with 
existing tools and in light of existing scientific understandings. In other 
words, the agency interprets the statute to allow regulation where  the 
benefits might be significant, but cannot be shown to be significant 
given existing knowledge. This, in short, is a case where there is a wide 
range of expected benefits, from quite low to quite high, and where 
science cannot choose a probable “point” along the range (not an 
uncommon situation; see tables 1 and 2 for examples). 
 
This does not seem to be an unreasonable interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute. Certainly the agency should be required to identify 
the range of potential benefits, so as to ensure that the possible gains, 
discounted by the probability that they will be realized, is sufficient to 
make regulation worthwhile.  It is not hard to imagine  cases of this 
kind; table 2 provides examples here as well. The basic point is that 
when scientific understanding is primitive, it can be perfectly 
reasonable to regulate risks that might be small but might be large. 
Indeed, such regulation might even survive cost-benefit balancing, 
notwithstanding the real possibility that when more is known, the risk 
will turn out to be de minimis. 
 
3.  Disregarding costs at one stage of a multistage inquiry. Might it be 
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consideration of costs? In some cases, this would indeed be reasonable. 
Recall that under the Clean Air Act, the EPA is supposed to set 
standards at the level that, with an “adequate margin of safety,” are 
“requisite to protect the public health.”210 At first glance it might 
appear quite unreasonable for the agency not to consider costs if it has 
the discretion to do so. Whether it is worthwhile to produce a certain 
level of benefits would seem to depend, at least in part, on the cost of 
achieving those benefits. But suppose that the EPA urges (as it has for 
a number of years, and as the Supreme Court has approved211) that 
costs will be considered not in setting standards in the first instance 
(where health is the sole consideration), but at other, later stages, in the 
development of state implementation plans and in insistence on 
deadlines for compliance. In such a system, the EPA would say that 
national ambient air quality standards are based only on an inquiry 
into issues of health, that this is a benefits-based judgment, but that the 
decision how and when to meet those standards, made through 
complex procedures at the state and federal levels, will consider costs 
as well as benefits.  
 
In fact this is how the Clean Air Act now operates.212 National 
standards are issued in what is at least nominally a cost-blind manner, 
but costs emphatically and opening play a part at other stages of the 
process, in the design and enforcement of state implementation plans. 
Whether or not it is ultimately convincing, this kind of procedural 
defense of “health only” judgments seems at least plausible. From this 
it follows that even if the relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act are 
taken to be ambiguous,213 it would be reasonable, under Chevron step 
2, to understand national standard-setting to be cost-blind, not because 
cost-blindness is itself reasonable (it isn’t), but because costs are taken 
into account at later stages of a multistage inquiry.214 Whether it would 
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be better for costs to be considered throughout is an issue on which 
reasonable people can differ. This is a highly pragmatic question, on 
which general enthusiasm for cost-benefit balancing is not decisive. 
 
4.  Disregarding particular costs as statutorily irrelevant. There are other 
arenas in which costs might reasonably be disregarded; at least 
agencies might disregard costs of a certain kind. Suppose, for example, 
that the FAA concluded that the needs of the air tour industry were 
entitled to no weight in issuing regulations controlling noise at the 
Grand Canyon. Under a different administration, the FAA might 
believe that the statute is best understood to ensure that those who 
enjoy the Grand Canyon can do so with a minimum of noise -- and 
that the adverse effects on the air tour industry are irrelevant, even if 
this means that fewer people will be able to enjoy the Grand Canyon. 
At first glance, this is an entirely reasonable judgment. Whee Congress 
has been unclear, administrations and administrators might make 
different decisions on that question. 
 
5.  Disregarding feasibility as part of overall balancing. Is it ever 
reasonable for an agency to ignore the question whether regulation is 
feasible for the industry? Might the FAA choose to interpret an 
ambiguous statute so as to impose an air quality regulation that would 
not be feasible for the air tour industry over the Grand Canyon, so that 
the relevant companies could not stay in business? At first glance, 
feasibility seems relevant; but it is possible to imagine cases in which 
an agency might reasonably choose to interpret a statute to allow rules 
that are not feasible. The agency might believe that it is more 
important to reduce noise levels than to allow the continued operation 
of the air tour industry. When judgments of this kind are made, the 
agency is effectively engaging in a kind of cost-benefit balancing, one 
that justifies regulation that is not feasible. Of course an agency might 
engage in technology-forcing, though usually this approach depends 
on a judgment that regulation is indeed feasible, because more 
advanced technologies  are feasible to develop. 
 
6.  Rights and irreversibility. Thus far the discussion has emphasized 
pragmatic or instrumental considerations. But are there contexts in 
which the cost-benefit default principles are inapplicable in principle? 
In many domains, of course, cost-benefit balancing fails to describe the 
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or at least costs of a certain kind.215 Ordinarily ideas of this sort play a 
role in constitutional law,216 where certain “costs” are off limits. For 
example, the costs undoubtedly associated with politically 
controversial speech are not a legitimate basis for regulating such 
speech. Those costs are entitled to no weight at all; it is not as if they 
count, but are insufficiently high.  
 
Such thinking is not foreign to regulatory policy. The most vivid 
example is the Endangered Species Act,217 which forbids agency from 
engaging in action that would threaten members of endangered species 
even if a balancing test would appear to justify the action.218 In holding 
that the statute disallows balancing, the Court relied on what is said was 
the unambiguous meaning of the text.219 But as Justice Powell showed in 
dissent, the language was not so clear as to disallow invocation of a strong 
default principle, one that would justify a degree of balancing.220 Can the 
outcome in the case be explained in a legal system pervaded by cost-
benefit default principles? 
 
Perhaps it cannot be. Perhaps the Court’s decision is an anachronism, 
inconsistent with the more contemporary judicial enthusiasm for 
balancing. But there is another explanation. The Endangered Species Act 
is concerned with preventing genuinely irreversible losses, and at least in 
the context of human activities that cause extinction, perhaps the statute is 
best taken to be rooted in a theory of rights, one that rebuts the 
presumption in favor of cost-benefit balancing. Now it is possible that 
some kind of “meta” balancing justifies a flat prohibition on actions that 
would destroy members of an endangered species. Perhaps that higher 
form of cost-benefit balancing calls for a refusal to engage in cost-benefit 
balancing in particular cases. The benefits might be thought to be so high, 
and the costs usually so low, as to support such a prohibition, disallowing 
balancing each time. But this way of understanding the statute seems to 
misconceive its foundations, which lie in a judgment that human beings 
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should not knowingly bring about the extinction of other species,221 at 
least in the absence of truly extraordinary circumstances.222 
 
It is possible to generalize from this example. Where regulatory policy 
is designed to ensure against irreversible damage, or otherwise to prevent 
the violation of rights, the cost-benefit default principles might well be 
displaced.  In most domains of regulatory policy, however, what is 
involved is not the danger of irreversible loss, but instead issues of degree, 
and hence the presumption remains intact. 
 
VI.  Unsettled Questions: Specifying the Principles 
 
The cost-benefit default principles leave many open questions. They are 
abstract and general. Courts have done extremely little to particularize them; 
agencies have done somewhat more, but they have made only a start.223 OMB has 
set out “best practices” for agency use224; because of the importance and 
generally high quality of OMB’s guidance, excerpts are included as an Appendix. 
It is here that a great deal of law will be made in the next decades. I offer a few 
remarks on the crucial issues. 
 
A.  The Incipient Common Law of Acceptable Risks 
 
What makes a risk “significant” or “de minimis”? Here the law is extremely 
ill-developed.  Perhaps we can find some agreed-upon standards for labeling a 
risk de minimis. If the risk is less than that created by eating a moderate number 
of peanuts with legally permitted aflotoxin levels, or from living in Denver rather 
than New York for a week every year, the case seems relatively easy. Risks of this 
little are the kind that people ignore each day. But how should we evaluate  (say) 
a cancer risk, from (say) a lifetime exposure to a certain carcinogenic  substance, 
of one in one million? One in 100,000? One in ten million? Does it matter if the 
exposed population is large or small?  
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These are the pivotal questions. For guidance, it might be noted that the 
International Commission on Radiological Protection recommends that 
environmental factors should not be allowed to cause an incremental cancer risk, 
for those exposed over a lifetime, of 3 in 1000 or more.225 But the practice of 
American agencies is highly variable,  with the EPA’s acceptable range varying, 
under different programs, from 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1,000,000.226  In the Benzene 
Case, the plurality of the Supreme Court attempted to provide some clarification, 
making a distinction between  two quantitatively different  levels of risk. If the 
risk of getting cancer from drinking a glass of water is one in a billion, the 
plurality said, it could not possibly be considered significant. 227 By contrast, a 
fatality risk of 1/1000 from regular inhalation of gasoline vapors “might well” be 
considered significant.228 OSHA has built on this simple idea in issuing its own 
regulations. Thus the agency has said that a lifetime risk of 1.64/1000 will be 
counted as significant, whereas a lifetime risk of 0.6 in 100,000 “may be 
approaching a level that can be viewed as safe.”229 
 
This is certainly a start, and in light of the Supreme Court’s statements, 
perhaps OSHA’s approach is sufficient to survive judicial scrutiny. Certainly an 
effort at quantification is a helpful way of clarifying the basis for the agency’s 
decision, especially laudable in light of the slipperiness of the idea of 
‘significance.” But many questions might be asked. In deciding whether a risk is 
trivial or significant, it would seem important to ask not only about the level of 
the risk faced by each person, but also about the size of the exposed 
population.230 If two people in the United States face a lifetime risk of 2/10,000, 
perhaps the risk should not be deemed significant in light of the fact that it is 
overwhelmingly likely that no fatalities will be suffered. We could easily imagine 
a challenge to a decision to treat such a risk as “significant” as a matter of law.231 
Certainly the agency should explain any failure to take account of the small 
number of exposed people -- even though it would probably be reasonable, as a 
matter of law, for the agency to concern itself with probabilities faced by 
individuals, at least if it is not permitted to engage in cost-benefit balancing.   
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At the same time, a statistically small risk, if faced by large numbers of 
people, might well be deemed significant. If twenty million people face a lifetime 
risk of 1/200,000, one hundred people are expected to die -- far from a trivial 
number.  We could easily imagine a challenge  to an agency decision to treat the 
latter risk as “insignificant”; indeed that challenge should probably succeed. The 
point raises serious doubts about the Supreme Court plurality’s confidence that a 
risk of one in  a billion, from drinking a glass of water, could not be deemed 
significant. If each person drinks five glasses of water  per day, and if there are 
260 million Americans, the one-in-a-billion  risk no longer seems so small, 
converted into expected annual fatalities  (474.5, hardly an insignificant number). 
We should therefore conclude that it is at least reasonable for agencies to 
consider risks to be “significant,” and not de minimis, if the probability is very 
low but the exposed population quite large. It is also reasonable to suggest that if 
the probability is very low but the exposed population sufficiently large, a high 
number of expected fatalities should require the agency to consider the risk 
“significant” as a matter of law.   
 
There is an additional problem. Both OSHA and the Supreme Court seem to 
focus on the “lifetime” risk – that is, the risk that would come from being 
exposed to a substance for all of one’s working life. Under OSHA, it does seem 
that this focus is required by the statute,  at least for toxic substances, for which 
the relevant provision is expressly drawn in terms of lifetime exposure.232 But in 
the abstract, and under other provisions, we should not be focussing on the risk, 
of fatality or anything else, that would come from a lifetime of exposure, except 
to the extent that all, most, or many people actually have a lifetime of exposure. 
Imagine, for example, that almost all workers in the relevant industry are 
exposed, not for their lifetimes, but for five years or less. What risk do they face? 
This is the crucial question. Perhaps the risk, for them, is a small fraction of the 
lifetime risk. Sensible policy requires the government to reduce the risks that 
people actually face, not the risk that people fancifully face. When an agency has 
discretion, the agency should look not at lifetime  risk, but at actual risk. 
 
What all this suggests is that when agencies are asking whether risks are 
significant, they ought to move in the direction of setting out a range of 
“expected benefits,” in terms of mortality, morbidity, and other relevant 
variables.233 These variables could be aggregated into some sort of total number, 
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below which a risk would be treated as insignificant. Of course there will be a 
large degree of guesswork in generating the relevant numbers. Of course too 
there will be a degree of arbitrariness in choosing the precise point at which risks 
are no longer significant. But without movement in the direction of 
quantification, it will not be possible to produce informed, transparent, and 
consistent policy.234 Thus an effort to quantify the level of risk that would be 
deemed acceptable would replace thc current system, with its high degree of 
inconsistency and guesswork, with something like a common law of acceptable  
risks.235 
 
B.  The Meaning of Feasibility: No “On-Off” Switch 
 
What does it mean to say that regulation must be “feasible”? In the abstract, a 
requirement that regulation be “feasible” might seem to invite cost-benefit  
balancing. In the private sector, a “feasibility study” is essentially an exercise in 
cost-benefit balancing. But as we have seen, a feasibility requirement involves no 
balancing of costs and benefits.236 It asks instead about cost-only inquiry into 
whether achievement of the regulatory goal is “practicable.”237 
 
Assume, for example, that a regulation would cost $800 million, and that in 
the process it would save 10 lives per year; assume also that the exposed 
population is relatively small, so that each of the exposed workers faces a lifetime 
risk of well over 1 in 1000.  It is easy to imagine that this regulation would be 
entirely feasible, in the sense that the industry would face no technical problems 
in meeting it, and also in the sense that it would be practicable  for industry to 
bear the cost. But it is also easy to imagine that such a regulation would fail cost-
benefit analysis, in the sense that $800 million expense would not be justified by 
the (relatively lower) monetized savings. If a statistical life is valued at $5 
million, for example, the benefits ($50 million) would be only one-eighth the cost.  
 
But it would be wrong to think that cost-benefit analysis is more 
“antiregulatory” than a feasibility constraint. We can easily imagine a regulation 
that might not be feasible, but that might satisfy a requirement of cost-benefit 
balancing. Suppose, for example, that a regulation would cost $2 billion, that 
industry could not bear that cost without many business failures, but  that the 
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regulation would save 5000 lives. In some cases, the cost-benefit requirement is 
more protective, not less protective, of intended beneficiaries of regulatory 
programs.  
 
So far, perhaps, things are clear enough. But there is a problem here as 
well.  Most important:  Feasibility is not an on-off switch. Any significant 
increase in costs is likely to prove “not feasible” for at least some companies. As 
the costs increase, the number of companies for whom the regulation proves “not 
feasible” will increase too. In these circumstances, it seems extremely artificial to 
say that at a certain point, regulation becomes “not feasible.” Perhaps there is a 
set point at which regulation, by virtue of its stringency, establishes a sudden, 
large-scale increase in the number of companies who cannot bear the cost of 
regulatory controls while continuing in business. But it is more likely that as the 
costs grow, the number of companies who cannot bear the cost grows too, 
perhaps with several specific points at which that number spikes upwards. In 
these circumstances, what sense is made by a “feasibility” constraint? At first 
glance, very little. Just as safety is not an absolute, but a matter of degree, so too 
for feasibility. Law that says otherwise appears to substitute a comforting but 
misleading formula for a serious confrontation with the issues at stake. 
 
 Perhaps there is an intelligible answer here. Perhaps Congress wants to 
say that for most regulations, companies must comply, unless a large number of 
them can show that they cannot comply and continue. And certainly this is a 
relatively simple inquiry in most cases. What makes little sense is the suggestion 
that agencies can pick a single point that is “feasible,” and go to, but not beyond, 
that point. 
 
In these circumstances, how can we account for the evident popularity of 
requirements that regulation be “feasible” or “achievable”? There are several 
possibilities, suggesting that the feasibility standard might be justified by 
reference to institutional considerations. From the standpoint of those concerned 
with safety and the environment, a cost-benefit standard might be thought to 
introduce undue opportunities for industry to stall the process, perhaps because 
of the prospect and actuality of judicial review. 238 A requirement that regulation 
must be “feasible’ greatly improves agency’s chances in court. In fact this 
conclusion is well-supported by the record of agencies on appeal; no agency has 
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ever lost a challenge  to the feasibility of its regulation, while cost-benefit 
requirements have proved troublesome for agencies in court.239  
 
This is a point about the goals of supporters of environmental regulation. 
From the standpoint of Congress, there is a separate point. A statute that 
expressly refers to cost-benefit balancing seems to invite complaints about the 
decision to trade off lives for dollars; hence statutes that embody CBA are 
unpopular in many circles. (It is noteworthy here that none of the actual and 
seriously considered enactments involving cost-benefit balancing has ever set out 
numbers for valuing regulatory benefits.)  Legislators who seek to avoid 
complaints about CBA, while also seeking to impose a constraint on excessive 
regulation, might naturally be drawn to feasibility requirements. From the 
standpoint of industry, perhaps “feasibility” statutes are not so troublesome if it 
is possible to maintain control over the agency’s docket and over appropriations, 
so as to ensure that draconian statutes are, in practice, far less than that. 
 
These points help explain the appeal of feasibility constraints. But they 
still do not tell us what such constraints mean. The best answer, not entirely 
satisfactory, is that a regulation becomes infeasible if it would result in 
significant dislocations in the industry, in the form of large numbers of business 
failures, substantial losses of jobs, or the equivalent.240 Ideas of this sort are 
qualitative, rather than quantitative, and in implementation, they leave a great 
deal of discretion to agencies. What  might be expected in the future is a more 
quantitative account from agencies implementing regulations  that are said to be 
feasible, or refusing to impose regulations said to be infeasible. 
 
C. Considering Costs 
 
What of principles (or statutes) that ask agencies to “take into 
consideration” costs (and other relevant factors)? Statutes of this kind typically 
include an “achievability” constraint as well, one that operates, in practice, in the 
same way as a feasibility requirement. What is added by the idea that agencies 
should also take costs into consideration?  
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The answer seems to be that such provisions give agencies the discretion 
not to go to the full extent of feasibility if the costs of doing so are 
disproportionately high. Suppose, for example, that a regulation would cost $800 
million and that it would save 10 lives annually. Suppose too that it is entirely 
feasible. If the agency is permitted to take costs into consideration, presumably it 
is permitted to impose a less intrusive regulation, or perhaps not to regulate at 
all. The foregoing sentence is qualified because the idea that costs must be taken 
“into consideration” does not say how much weight costs must have; it does not 
say, by itself, to what extent agencies must treat costs as relevant to the ultimate 
decision. Presumably it would be unlawful for an agency to ignore costs 
altogether. If the agency were permitted to do this, the “consideration” 
requirement would be empty. At a minimum, then, the agency must discuss cost 
and explain its decision in light of cost. Similarly, an agency that is allowed to 
“consider” costs, but need not take account of feasibility, is authorized  to soften 
regulation by selecting less expensive and also less effective means.241 Hard 
questions would arise if an agency authorized to “consider” costs chooses means 
that are much less expensive but also much less effective. 
 
This is a procedural understanding of the “consideration” requirement, 
one that has precedent under other statutes.242 But is there a substantive 
requirement as well? Must an agency give some kind of weight to costs, in 
addition to discussing them? The best answer is “yes” to both questions. An 
agency decision would be unlawful if it  gave no weight whatsoever to costs, as, 
for example, through the choice of a regulation that would do only trivially more 
good than one that would be 50% less costly. An agency decision would also be 
doubtful if it made costs an overriding factor as, for example, by choosing a 
regulation that is slightly less expensive (say, $1 million annually) but also much 
less effective (say, because it would leave 30 additional deaths annually).  
 
On this view, a requirement that an agency take costs into consideration 
falls short of cost-benefit analysis, in the sense that the agency is expected to give 
principal weight to the initially identified factor, and from there to make 
adjustments because of costs. An agency would run into difficulty if it 
transformed costs into the overriding statutory factor or if it gave costs no 
substantive consideration at all. These are the polar cases for administrative 
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illegality. Cases that fall between the poles should present hard line-drawing 
questions, but no serious conceptual issues. 
 
D. Of Costs and Benefits 
 
It remains to discuss the largest problem of all. If cost-benefit balancing is 
required, what is an agency permitted to do? What is it prohibited from doing? 
Of course there are hard issues of valuation here.  If an agency values a life at $10 
million, it will produce outcomes very different from those that would be follow 
if it valued a life at $500,000. Is an agency permitted to value a life at, say, $100 
million, or at $50,000?243  
 
1. Basic issues of valuation: the standard approach. For several decades, 
agencies have undertaken cost-benefit analysis of major regulations, even when 
cost-benefit analysis is not the basis for decision but is merely a matter of 
informing the public about the consequences of proposed courses of action.244 But 
how are costs and benefits to be calculated? In principle, the issue is often easier 
to resolve on the cost side, though the practical problems here can be very 
serious, especially in light of industry’s incentive to overestimate costs. With 
respect to benefits, the now-standard approach involves an effort to calculate 
people’s “willingness to pay” for the various goods at stake.245 Sophisticated 
(though still controversial246) methods are available for this purpose.247  
 
  There remains a good deal of variation across agencies, with statistical 
lives being valued at between $1.5 million and $5.8 million.248 With respect to 
statistical lives, consider the following table249: 
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Table 3: Valuations of Life 
 
AGENCY REGULATION  CITATION    VALUE 
($ mil.) 
Department of Transportation – 
Federal Aviation Administration 
Proposed Establishment of the 
Harlingen Airport Radar Service 
Area, TX 
55 FR 32064 
August 6, 1990 
1.5 
Department of Agriculture – Food 
Safety and Inspection Service 
Pathogen Reduction: Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control 
Point Systems 
61 FR 38806 
July 25, 1996 
1.6 
Department of Health and 
Human Services – Food and Drug 
Administration 
Regulations Restricting the Sale 
and Distribution of Cigarettes 
and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect 
Children and Adolescents 
61 FR 44396  
August 28, 
1996 
2.5 
Department of Transportation – 
Federal Aviation Administration 
Aircraft Flight Simulator Use in 
Pilot Training, Testing, and 
Checking and at Training Centers 
61 FR 34508 
July 2, 1996 
2.7 
Environmental Protection Agency   Protection of Stratospheric Ozone  53 FR 30566 
August 12, 
1988 
3 
Department of Health and 
Human Services – Food and Drug 
Administration 
Proposed Rules to Amend the 
Food Labeling Regulations 
56 FR 60856 
November 27, 
1991 
3 
Department of Transportation – 
Federal Aviation Administration 
Financial Responsibility 
Requirements for Licensed 
Launch Activities 
61 FR 38992 
July 25, 1996 
3 
Department of Agriculture – Food 
and Nutrition Service 
Proposed National School Lunch 
Program and School Breakfast 
Program 
59 FR 30218 
June 10, 1994 
1.5, 3.0 
Environmental Protection Agency  National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards for Particulate Matter 
62 FR 38652 
July 18, 1997 
4.8 
Environmental Protection Agency  National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards for Ozone 
62 FR 38856 
July 18, 1996 
4.8 
Department of Health and 
Human Services – Food and Drug 
Administration 
Medical Devices: Current Good 
Manufacturing Practice 
61 FR 52602 
October 7, 
1996 
5 
Department of Health and 
Human Services – Public Health 
Service, Food and Drug 
Administration 
Quality Mammography 
Standards 
62 FR 55852 
October 28, 
1997 
5 
Environmental Protection Agency  Requirements for Lead-Based 
Paint Activities in Target 
Housing and Child-Occupied 
Facilities 
61 FR 45778 
August 29, 
1996 
5.5 
Environmental Protection Agency  National Primary Drinking 
Water Regulations: Disinfectants 
and Disinfection Byproducts 
63 FR 69390 
December 16, 
1998 
5.6 
Environmental Protection Agency  Radon in Drinking Water Health 
Risk Reduction and Cost 
Analysis 
64 FR 9560 
February 26, 
1999 
5.8 
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Notwithstanding these variations, willingness to pay is the general basis for 
undertaking calculations. It is on the basis of this sort of analysis that the EPA 
compiled the following table,250 which can be taken as representative: 
 
Table 4:  Willingness-to-Pay Estimates (Mean Values) 
 
Health Endpoint  Mean WTP Value per Incident 
(1990 $) 
Mortality 
    Life saved 
    Life year extended 
 
$4.8 million 
$120,000 
Hospital Admissions: 
     All Respiratory Illnesses, all ages 
     Pneumonia, age < 65 
     COPD, age > 65 
     Ischemic Heart Disease, age < 65 
     Congestive Heart Failure, age > 65 
     Emergency Visits for Asthma 
 
$12,700 
$13,400 
$15,900 
$ 20,600 
$ 16,600 
$9,000 
Chronic Bronchitis  $260,000 
Upper Respiratory Symptoms  $19 
Lower Respiratory Symptoms  $12 
Acute Bronchitis  $45 
Acute Respiratory Symptoms (any of 19)  $18 
Asthma $32 
Shortness of Breath  $5.30 
Sinusitis and Hay Fever  Not monetized 
Work Loss Days  $83 
Restricted Activity Days (RAD) 
     Minor RAD 
     Respiratory RAD 
 
$38 
not monetized 
Worker Productivity  $1 per worker per 10% change in ozone 
Visibility: residential 
 
                 Recreational 
$14 per unit decrease in deciview per 
household 
Range of $7.30 to $11 per unit decrease in 
deciview per household (see U.S. EPA, 1997a) 
Household Soiling Damage  $2.50 per household per ￿g/m3 
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  To become intelligible, of course, these numbers must be combined with 
an assessment of the problems that would be averted with various approaches to 
regulation. As an example of such an assessment, consider the following: 
 
Table 5: Proposed PM10 Standard (50/150 ￿g/m3 ) 99th Percentile 
  National Annual Health Incidence Reductions 
 
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and PM NAAQS:  (year = 2010) 
ENDPOINT    Partial Attainment 
Scenario 
  Annual PM2.5 
(￿g/m3) 
50 
  Daily PM2.5  
(￿g/m3) 
150 
*1. Mortality: short-term exposure 
                          long-term exposure 
360 
340 
*2. Chronic Bronchitis  6,800 
Hospital Admissions: 
   *3. all respiratory (all ages) 
all resp. (ages 65+) 
pneumonia (ages 65+) 
COPD (ages 65+) 
   *4. Congestive heart failure  
   *5. Ischemic heart disease 
 
190 
470 
170 
140 
130 
140 
*6. Acute Bronchitis  1,100 
*7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms  
*8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms 
shortness of breath 
asthma attacks 
10,400 
5,300 
18,300 
8,800 
*9. Work Loss Days  106,000 
*10. Minor Restricted Activity Days (MRADs)  879,000 
 
  A simple exercise of multiplication, putting the two tables together, will  
generate monetized  benefits, which can then be compared with monetized costs. 
Of course it is possible to challenge  the numbers in both tables. Perhaps the 
agency has understated or overstated the number of lives saved or chronic 
bronchitis cases; perhaps the agency has overvalued or undervalued the dollar 
value of life or other health benefits. In fact evidence suggests that prospective 58  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
estimates are bound to contain serious errors. The Office of Technology 
Assessment, asked in 1992 to evaluate the accuracy of OSHA’s prospective 
estimates, found many mistakes.251 But the basic method increasingly dominates 
administrative practice. 
 
2. Legal floors and ceilings. When would a given cost-benefit ratio be held 
to be unlawful? The simplest answer is that when the costs significantly exceed 
the benefits, when these are properly measured. A reasonable agency might 
begin with numbers near the middle of both market valuations252 and 
government valuations253  – in the case of a statistical life, somewhere between $3 
million and $7 million.254 If an agency seeks to deviate from those numbers, it 
should explain why. The basic idea is that there should be a presumption in 
favor of adherence to the normal range, with an explanation of departures from 
the numbers thus indicated. And if the agency seeks to go forward with a 
regulation whose costs significantly exceed benefits, it should have to explain 
why it is doing that. 
 
A legitimate risk in allowing departures is that the stated rationale will 
conceal an effort to placate powerful private groups not having a strong claim to 
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Estimated Costs and Benefits of OSHA Rules:  Prospective vs. Retrospective 
Regulation Year 
Issued 
Estimated Costs  Estimated Benefits 
Vinyl Chloride (a)  1974  Overestimated by a factor of four  Not clear 
Cotton Dust (a)  1978  Overestimated by a factor of three  Overestimated by more than 
a factor of two 
Lead (Secondary 
Smelters) 
1978  Capital costs significantly 
underestimated 
Overestimated the 
importance of engineering 
controls in achieving benefits 
Ethylene Oxide 
(Hospitals) (a) 
1984  About right  Not clear 
Formaldehyde (Metal 
Foundries) 
1987  Over by a factor of two (although 
costs of engineering controls 
considerably underestimated) 
Not clear 
Grain Handling  1987  Not clear  Not clear 
PSDI Power Presses (b)  1988  Underestimated costs, overestimated benefits, or both 
Powered Platforms (b)  1989  Underestimated costs, overestimated benefits, or both 
 
252 See W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J Legal Stud (2000). 
253 See Stephen Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 30-31 (1999); Matthew 
Adler and Eric Posner, supra note. 
254 But see Robert Frank and Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, U Chi 
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governmental assistance.255 Notwithstanding this risk, there are several possible 
grounds for making adjustments. For example, an agency might make a 
reasonable upward adjustment if it believes that children are largely at risk -- 
perhaps because more life-years are at stake, perhaps because children are 
unable to protect themselves and hence have a special equitable claim to 
government resources.256 A downward adjustment would similarly be lawful if 
the agency finds that mostly old people are at risk, so that any extensions of lives 
would produce a low level of savings in terms of life-years. Or the agency might 
reasonably conclude that special attention should be given to risks faced by poor 
people or African-Americans, on the ground that existing injustice is 
compounded in a situation in which health and environmental dangers are thus 
concentrated.   
 
Agencies should also be permitted to take into account the fact that people 
care about relative economic position, not only absolute economic position, and 
thus to adjust market valuations upwards.257 And the agency could reasonably 
employ “incidence  analysis” to conclude that regulation should go forward 
notwithstanding the fact tha benefits exceed costs (see the reference to 
distributional considerations in OMB’s “best practices” document, in the 
appendix). If, for example, the benefits are $800 million, but enjoyed mostly by 
low-income workers, whereas the costs are $900 million, but faced mostly by 
consumers generally, it seems reasonable for the agency to go forward, at least if 
Congress has not expressly precluded that judgment. 
 
There is a larger point here. In addition to knowing the benefits and costs 
of regulation, it is necessary to know who bears those costs and enjoys those 
benefits, and also the particular nature of those costs and benefits. Suppose, for 
example, that an occupational safety and health regulation would have a total 
cost of $600 million, and that the monetized benefits would be $400 million 
(including,  let us say, 40 lives saved per year, and hence $200 million in 
monetized savings from fatalities averted). Is it clear that this regulation should 
not go forward? For various reasons it is not. If the people who are saved are 
children or teenagers, the uniform lives saved number might undervalue the 
relevant benefits. Equally important: What does the $600 million mean, 
concretely?  Does it mean that prices will increase, by a little, for many people? 
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That cost might be worth incurring. So too if the consequence of the $600 million 
expenditure would be a reduction in annual profits for companies that already 
make billions. Or does the cost mean that poor people will lose their jobs? An 
ideal cost-benefit analysis would tell us something about the incidence of both 
costs and benefits. It makes sense to say that the “bottom line” numbers will not 
be decisive when an incidence analysis shows that those numbers should be 
adjusted to take account of the identify of the winners and losers. Of course it is 
possible to think that we lack the tools to engage in a good incidence analysis, or 
that an assessment of distributional issues will be subject to interest-group 
manipulation, and hence that the “bottom line” numbers should be used for 
pragmatic reasons.258 
 
While these points give agencies a degree of flexibility, they do not give 
them carte blanche, because they operate in limited domains, and because they 
come with a duty of reasoned explanation. This duty is procedural, but it is far 
more than that. In the Corrosion Proof Fittings case, for example, it is hard to see 
how the agency could have justified the extreme cost-benefit ratios that applied 
to certain bans on asbestos.259 
 
3. The discount rate. Perhaps the most difficult issue here, from the 
theoretical point of view, involves the selection of the appropriate discount rate. 
How should the agency value future gains and losses? In terms of ultimate 
outcomes, the choice matters a great deal. If an agency chooses a discount rate of 
2%, the outcome will be very different from what it would be an agency chooses 
a discount rate of 10%; the benefits calculation will shift dramatically as a result. 
If a human life is valued at $8 million, and if an agency chooses a 10% discount 
rate, a life saved 100 years from now is worth only $581.260 “At a discount rate of 
five pecent, one death next year counts for more than a billion deaths in 500 
years.”261 OMB suggests a 7% discount rate (see Appendix); but this is highly 
controversial. A key question is therefore: What legal constraints should be 
imposed on the agency’s choice?262  
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My basic conclusion is that it is much harder to untangle the theoretical 
issue than to identify the appropriate posture of reviewing courts. In this highly 
technical area, courts should adopt a posture of deference, requiring agencies 
only to produce a reasonable explanation for their choice and to show a degree of 
consistency. Part of the reason for deference is the extreme complexity of the 
underlying issues. Part of the reason is the risk that an aggressive judicial posture 
would contribute to the “ossification” of rulemaking263  -- a particular problem in 
this setting, because any particular discount rate will be easy to challenge,  with 
reasonable arguments suggesting that it is too low or too high.264 To understand 
these points, some details are in order.   
 
Usually statutes are silent on the question of appropriate discount rate. In 
fact I have been unable to find any statute that specifies a discount rate for 
agencies to follow. On judicial review, the question will therefore involve a claim 
that the agency’s choice is arbitrary. Here the national government  shows 
strikingly (and inexplicably) variable practices. As noted, the Office of 
Management and Budget suggests a 7% discount rate,265 departing from a 10% 
rate in the 1980s.266 But agencies are not bound by OMB guidelines, and they 
have ranged from as low as 3% (Food and Drug Administration, Department of 
Housing and Urban development ) to as high as 10% (EPA).267 In fact the same 
agency sometimes endorses different discount rates for no apparent reason -- 
with EPA, for example, selecting a 3% rate for regulation of lead-based paint as 
compared to 7% for regulation of drinking water,  and 10% rates, respectively,  
for regulation of emissions from locomotives.268 Here government practice seems 
extremely erratic. 
 
From the purely economic standpoint, there are serious conundrums 
here.269 The impetus for discounting future effects stems from the judgment that 
in the context of money, discounting future benefits and losses is entirely 
rational, even simple: A dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow. 
There are two reasons: investment value (or opportunity cost) and pure time 
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preference.270 A dollar today can be invested, and for this reason it is worth more 
than a dollar a year from now. An emphasis on the investment value of money 
yields a discount rate of roughly 5%-7%. Quite apart from this point, people 
generally seem to have a preference for receiving money sooner rather than later.  
People value current consumption more than they value future consumption; for 
this reason alone, $1000 is worth more today than it is in a decade.  An inquiry 
into pure time preference produces discount rates of 1%-3%. Though they lead to 
different numbers, both points justify discounting future income gains and 
losses. 
 
So far, so good. The problem is that notwithstanding conventional 
wisdom among economists, these points are not easily taken to justify a discount 
rate for the nonmonetary benefits of regulation (see table 5 for an overview of 
such benefits). If a regulation will save ten lives this year, and ten years annually 
for the next ten years, it cannot plausibly be urged that the future savings are 
worth less than the current savings, on the ground that a current life saved can 
be immediately “invested.” The point about investment value, or the 
opportunity cost of using capital, seems utterly irrelevant here. With time 
preference, things are less clear. Perhaps people would rather save ten lives 
today than ten lives in a decade. But it is unclear that this is so; and even if it is, 
what moral status would such a time preference have? Almost certainly it makes 
sense to say that it would be worse for you to lose your limb now than to lose it 
in ten years; in the latter case, you will have ten years of use of the limb. And 
probably it makes sense to say that agencies should attend to life-years saved, 
not only lives saved. But holding all this constant, the death of a thirty-five year 
old in 2004 does not seem worth more than the death of a thirty-five year old in 
2044. And since different people are involved, the moral problem is serious: The 
preference of the chooser in 2002 is certainly relevant to determining that 
chooser’s own fate, and the timing of risks that might come to fruition for that 
chooser; but the chooser’s preference cannot easily be used to determine the fate 
of someone not yet born. 
 
These points suggest that, as Richard Revesz suggests, it is important to 
distinguish two issues that go under the name of “discounting” and that have yet 
to be separated in administrative practice:  (a) latent harms, in the form of 
exposures whose consequences will occur late in someone’s lifetime; and (b) 
harms to future generations.271 It is reasonable to say that latent harms should 
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count for less than immediate ones, since they remove few years from people’s 
lives. Some kind of discount rate is sensible here, although OMB’s 7% figure is 
probably too high.272 The case of harms to future generations, or people not yet 
born, is altogether different, and in that case the usual grounds for discounting 
monetary benefits are quite inapplicable. For this reason some people think that 
no discounting is appropriate for the nonmonetary benefits of regulation.273 On 
this view,  a life-year saved is a life-year saved, and it does not matter, for 
purposes of valuation, when the saving occurs.  
 
But there is a major objection to this way of proceeding: It would appear 
to require truly extraordinary sacrifices from the present for the sake of the 
(infinite) future. Perhaps the “failure to discount would leave all generations at a 
subsistence level of existence, because benefits would be postponed perpetually 
for the future.”274 On the other hand, it is not clear that the assumption behind 
this objection is convincing. Technological and other advances made by the 
current generation benefit future generations as well, and hence impoverishment 
of the current generation would inevitably harm those who will come later.275 In 
any case there is a hard ethical question here – how much the current generation 
should suffer for the benefit of the future – and a judgment against discounting 
would not answer that question unless we were sure that as a matter of policy, 
we should be engaging in maximizing some aggregate welfare function.276 It is 
not at all clear that this form of maximization is the appropriate choice to make. 
 
At this point it should be clear that these issues are exceedingly complex 
and that agencies asked to engage in cost-benefit analysis have no clear path to 
an appropriate choice of discount rate. My principal topic, however, is not 
regulatory policy, but the implementation of the cost-benefit default principles. 
In the face of the underlying conundrums, the most that a reviewing court can 
require is a rationale for the agency’s choice that is both articulated and 
reasonable. There are several possibilities here,277 suggesting what courts should 
and should not do.  
 
                                                 
272 See id. at 981-87. 
273 Id. at 987-1009 (offering a qualified version of this view). 
274 See David Pearce and R. Kelly Turner, Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment 
223-24 (1990). 
275 Revesz, supra note, at 994. 
276 Tyler Cowen and Derek Perfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in Justice Between Age 
Groups and Generations 149 (Peter Laslett and James Fishkin eds. 1992). 
277 For a good discussion, see Daniel Farber, Ecopragmatism (1999). 64  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
   Courts should not require costs and benefits to have the same discount 
rate, at least not if costs are to be absorbed in terms of dollars and 
benefits will come in terms of fatalities and illnesses averted. It follows 
that in Corrosion Proof Fittings case, the court of appeals was quite 
wrong to tell EPA to produce an “apples-to-apples comparison, even if 
this entails discounting benefits of a non-monetary nature.”278  
   Courts should not simply defer to agency decisions as a “policy 
choice,” as did one court in an unusually complex setting.279 What is 
necessary is some kind of explanation for the choice.  
   Courts should acknowledge that good explanations  can be given for a 
wide range of choices – between,  say, a discount rate of 0% (for future 
generations, not latent harms) and 7% (OMB’s suggestion). So long as 
the agency gives a sensible rationale and departs from it only on the 
basis of articulated reasons, courts should respect the choice.  The 
value judgments here can be reasonably disputed, and they should be 
made democratically, not judicially. It follows that in the context of 
discount rates, as elsewhere, the common law of cost-benefit analysis is 
to be developed at the administrative level, subject only to judicial 
review for reasonableness. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
In this Article I have attempted to identify the cost-benefit default 
principles, to defend their use, and to explore their meaning for the future. In the 
face of statutory ambiguity, courts are now permitting agencies to refuse to 
regulate when  a significant risk is not shown; to refuse to regulate beyond  the 
point where regulation is not feasible; to consider costs; and to engage in a form 
of cost-benefit balancing. At their least intrusive, the cost-benefit default rules 
allow the agency to go in the suggested direction when the statute is unclear. At 
their most intrusive, the principles require the agency to act in the way they 
suggest unless Congress has unambiguously said otherwise.   
 
I have argued on behalf of both the least and most intrusive version of the 
cost-benefit default rules, by suggesting that they are likely to give sense and 
rationality the benefit of the doubt. At the same time, I have urged that the 
argument on their behalf is presumptive only, and that in certain contexts, 
agencies have good reasons for embarking on a different course. The question is 
                                                 
278 Corrosion Proof Fittings, supa note, 947 F.2d at 1218. 
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whether agencies have been able to suffer a reasonable defense of their decision 
to that effect. 
 
I have also attempted to set out some guidelines for the future, both under 
the cost-benefit default principles and under statutes that point in the same 
direction. It is necessary for agencies to particularize  the idea of “significant” 
and “de minimis” risks through quantitative  guidelines. A large point here is 
that the statistical probability of harm is not all that matters; the size of the 
exposed population is important as well. “Feasibility” is not an off-on switch, 
and here too agencies should specify what they understand the term to mean, 
beginning with the admittedly  vague notion that massive dislocations would be 
both necessary and sufficient to show that regulation is not feasible. We have 
seen that with respect to valuation of life and health, market measures can 
provide a good start, from which agencies are entitled to make reasonable 
adjustments. We have also seen that the most difficult issue involves selection of 
the appropriate discount rate. Reviewing courts should not require agencies to 
apply the same discount rate to life and health that they apply to money; with 
respect to discounting, there are good reasons to distinguish money from other 
goods. The most that courts can do is to impose ceilings and floors on agency 
judgments, by requiring a good rationale for whatever  discount rate is chosen. 
 
The most general conclusion, signaled by the rise of the cost-benefit 
default principles, is that the nation is nearing the end of a “first generation” 
debate about whether to adopt a presumption in favor of cost-benefit balancing, 
and rapidly moving into a “second generation” debate about when the 
presumption is rebutted, and about what cost-benefit analysis specifically entails. 
If cost-benefit analysis is to be defended, it is not because of especially 
controversial judgments of value, but because of a belief that regulatory action 
should be judged largely in terms of its consequences.280 Suitably specified and 
understood, the cost-benefit default principles should be regarded, not as a 
technique for stalling desirable regulation, but as a pragmatic effort to ensure 
that regulation responds to serious problems rather than to trivial or imaginary 
ones. And if they are seen in these terms, the cost-benefit default principles 
operate not only a foundation for deterring regulation that promises to do less 
                                                 
280 Of course there is no way of assessing consequences, or even identifying them, that is entirely 
neutral on evaluative questions. What I mean to suggest is that agreed-upon  understandings  can 
do the necessary work here. See the outline of the track record of cost-benefit analysis at EPA, 
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good than harm, but also as a basis for producing regulatory action where an 
assessment of the consequences shows that regulation is desirable.281  
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Appendix: Excerpts from OMB Guidance on Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
The following consists of excerpts from OMB’s “best practices” guidelines 
for cost-benefit analysis. Because the understanding of cost-benefit analysis is so 
much better developed within OMB than within courts and the legal culture, it is 
worth attending, with some care, to OMB’s suggestions. I have challenged some 
of OMB’s claims – especially on the appropriate discount rate – but there is no 
question that OMB has offered a helpful and thoughful treatment of many of the 
underlying problems. 
 
 
January 11, 1996 
 
Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations under Executive Order 12866 
 
III. ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS AND COSTS 
. . . 
A. General Principles 
 
3. Discounting. One of the problems that arises in developing a benefit-
cost analysis is that the benefits and costs often occur in different time periods. 
When this occurs, it is not appropriate, when comparing benefits and costs, to 
simply add up the benefits and costs accruing over time. Discounting takes 
account of the fact that resources (goods or services) that are available in a given 
year are worth more than the identical resources available in a later year. One 
reason for this is that resources can be invested so as to return more resources 
later. In addition, people tend to be impatient and to prefer earlier consumption 
over later consumption. 
 
(a) Basic considerations. Constant-dollar benefits and costs must be 
discounted to present values before benefits and costs in different years can be 
added together to determine overall net benefits. To obtain constant dollar 
estimates, benefit and cost streams in nominal dollars should be adjusted to 
correct for inflation. The basic guidance on discount rates for regulatory and 
other analyses is provided in OMB Circular A-94. The discount rate specified in 
that guidance is intended to be an approximation of the opportunity cost of 
capital, which is the before-tax rate of return to incremental private investment. 
The Circular A-94 rate, which was revised in 1992 based on an extensive review 
and public comment, reflects the rates of return on low yielding forms of capital, 
such as housing, as well as the higher rates of returns yielded by corporate 68  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
capital. This average rate currently is estimated to be 7 percent in real terms (i.e., 
after adjusting for inflation).  . . . 
 
Even those benefits and costs that are hard to quantify in monetary terms 
should be discounted.. . . . 
 
(b) Additional considerations. Modern research in economic theory has 
established a preferred model for discounting, sometimes referred to as the 
shadow price approach. The basic concept is that economic welfare is ultimately 
determined by consumption; investment affects welfare only to the extent that it 
affects current and future consumption. Thus, any effect that a government 
program has on public or private investment must be converted to an associated 
stream of effects on consumption before being discounted. 
 
Converting investment-related benefits and costs to their consumption-
equivalents as required by this approach involves calculating the "shadow price 
of capital." This shadow price reflects the present value of the future changes in 
consumption arising from a marginal change in investment, using the 
consumption rate of interest (also termed the rate of time preference) as the 
discount rate.  . . .  
 
4. Treatment of Risk and Uncertainty.  . . . Often risks, benefits, and costs 
are measured imperfectly because key parameters are not known precisely; 
instead, the economic analysis must rely upon statistical probability distributions 
for the values of parameters. Both the inherent lack of certainty about the 
consequences of a potential hazard (for example, the odds of contracting cancer) 
and the lack of complete knowledge about parameter values that define risk 
relationships (for example, the relationship between presence of a carcinogen in 
the food supply and the rate of absorption of the carcinogen) should be 
considered. 
 
. . .  
 
 (a) Risk assessment. . . . Data relating to effects that can be identified may 
be sketchy, incomplete, or subject to measurement error or statistical bias. 
Exposures and sensitivities to risks may vary considerably across the affected 
population. These difficulties can lead, for example, to a range of quantitative 
estimates of risk in health and ecological risk assessments that can span several 
orders of magnitude. Uncertainties in cost estimates also can be significant, in 
particular because of lack of experience with the adjustments that markets can 69  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
make to reduce regulatory burdens, the difficulty of identifying and quantifying 
opportunity cost, and the potential for enhanced or retarded technical 
innovation. All of these concerns should be reflected in the uncertainties about 
outcomes that should be incorporated in the analysis. 
 
The treatment of uncertainty in developing risk, benefit, and cost 
information also must be guided by the principles of full disclosure and 
transparency, as with other elements of an EA. Data, models, and their 
implications for risk assessment should be identified in the risk characterization. 
. . . .  
 
In order for the EA to evaluate outcomes involving risks, risk assessments 
must provide some estimates of the probability distribution of risks with and 
without the regulation. Whenever it is possible to quantitatively characterize the 
probability distributions, some estimates of central tendency (e.g., mean and 
median) must be provided in addition to ranges, variances, specified low-end 
and high-end percentile estimates, and other characteristics of the distribution. 
 
Overall risk estimates cannot be more precise than their most uncertain 
component. Thus, risk estimates should be reported in a way that reflects the 
degree of uncertainty present in order to prevent creating a false sense of 
precision. The accuracy with which quantitative estimates are reported must be 
supported by the quality of the data and models used. In all cases, the level of 
precision should be stated explicitly. 
 
Overall uncertainty is typically a consequence of uncertainties about many 
different factors. Appropriate statistical techniques should be used to combine 
uncertainties about separate factors into an overall probability distribution for a 
risk. . . . 
 
Uncertainty may arise from a variety of fundamentally different sources, 
including lack of data, variability in populations or natural conditions, 
limitations in fundamental scientific knowledge (both social and natural) 
resulting in lack of knowledge about key relationships, or fundamental 
unpredictability of various phenomena. The nature of these different sources 
may suggest different approaches. For example, when uncertainty is due to lack 
of information, one policy alternative may be to defer action pending further 
study. One factor that may help determine whether further study is justifiable as 
a policy alternative is an evaluation of the potential benefits of the information 
relative to the resources needed to acquire it and the potential costs of delaying 70  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
action. When uncertainty is due largely to observable variability in populations 
or natural conditions, one policy alternative may be to refine targeting, that is, to 
differentiate policies across key subgroups. Analysis of such policies should 
consider the incremental benefits of improved efficiency from targeting, any 
incremental costs of monitoring and enforcement, and changes in the 
distribution of benefits and costs. . . . 
 
7. Nonmonetized Benefits and Costs. Presentation of monetized benefits 
and costs is preferred where acceptable estimates are possible. However, 
monetization of some of the effects of regulations is often difficult if not 
impossible, and even the quantification of some effects may not be easy. Effects 
that cannot be fully monetized or otherwise quantified should be described. 
Those effects that can be quantified should be presented along with qualitative 
information to characterize effects that are not quantified. 
 
Irrespective of the presentation of monetized benefits and costs, the EA 
should present available physical or other quantitative measures of the effects of 
the alternative actions to help decisionmakers understand the full effects of 
alternative actions. These include the magnitude, timing, and likelihood of 
impacts, plus other relevant dimensions (e.g., irreversibility and uniqueness). For 
instance, assume the effects of a water quality regulation include increases in fish 
populations and habitat over the affected stream segments and that it is not 
possible to monetize such effects. It would then be appropriate to describe the 
benefits in terms of stream miles of habitat improvement and increases in fish 
population by species (as well as to describe the timing and likelihood of such 
effects, etc.).  . . . 
 
8. Distributional Effects and Equity. Those who bear the costs of a 
regulation and those who enjoy its benefits often are not the same people. The 
term "distributional effects" refers to the description of the net effects of a 
regulatory alternative across the population and economy, divided up in various 
ways (e.g., income groups, race, sex, industrial sector). Benefits and costs of a 
regulation may be distributed unevenly over time, perhaps spanning several 
generations. Distributional effects may also arise through "transfer payments" 
arising from a regulatory action. For example, the revenue collected through a 
fee, surcharge, or tax (in excess of the cost of any service provided) is a transfer 
payments. 
 
Where distributive effects are thought to be important, the effects of 
various regulatory alternatives should be described quantitatively to the extent 71  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
possible, including their magnitude, likelihood, and incidence of effects on 
particular groups. Agencies should be alert for situations in which regulatory 
alternatives result in significant changes in treatment or outcomes for different 
groups. Effects on the distribution of income that are transmitted through 
changes in market prices can be important, albeit sometimes difficult to assess. 
The EA should also present information on the streams of benefits and costs over 
time in order to provide a basis for judging intertemporal distributional 
consequences, particularly where intergenerational effects are concerned. 
 
There are no generally accepted principles for determining when one 
distribution of net benefits is more equitable than another. Thus, the EA should 
be careful to describe distributional effects without judging their fairness. These 
descriptions should be broad, focusing on large groups with small effects per 
capita as well as on small groups experiencing large effects per capita. Equity 
issues not related to the distribution of policy effects should be noted when 
important and described quantitatively to the extent feasible. 
 
B. Benefit Estimates 
. . . 
 
The calculation of benefits (including benefits of risk reductions) should 
reflect the full probability distribution of potential consequences. For example, 
extreme safety or health results should be weighted, along with other possible 
outcomes, by estimates of their probability of occurrence based on the available 
evidence to estimate the expected result of a proposed regulation. To the extent 
possible, the probability distributions of benefits should be presented. Extreme 
estimates should be presented as complements to central tendency and other 
estimates. If fundamental scientific disagreement or lack of knowledge precludes 
construction of a scientifically defensible probability distribution, benefits should 
be described under plausible alternative assumptions, along with a 
characterization of the evidence underlying each alternative view.  . . . 
 
1. General Considerations. The concept of "opportunity cost" is the 
appropriate construct for valuing both benefits and costs. The principle of 
"willingness-to-pay" captures the notion of opportunity cost by providing an 
aggregate measure of what individuals are willing to forgo to enjoy a particular 
benefit. Market transactions provide the richest data base for estimating benefits 
based on willingness-to-pay, as long as the goods and services affected by a 
potential regulation are traded in markets. It is more difficult to estimate benefits 
where market transactions are difficult to monitor or markets do not exist. 72  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Regulatory analysts in these cases need to develop appropriate proxies that 
simulate market exchange. Indeed, the analytical process of deriving benefit 
estimates by simulating markets may suggest alternative regulatory strategies 
that create such markets. 
 
Either willingness-to-pay (WTP) or willingness-to-accept (WTA) can 
provide an appropriate measure of benefits, depending on the allocation of 
property rights. The common preference for WTP over WTA measures is based 
on the empirical difficulties in estimating the latter.  . . .  
 
2. Principles for Valuing Benefits Directly Traded in Markets. Ordinarily, 
goods and services are to be valued at their market prices. However, in some 
instances, the market value of a good or service may not reflect its true value to 
society. 
 
If a regulatory alternative involves changes in such a good or service, its 
monetary value for purposes of benefit-cost analysis should be derived using an 
estimate of its true value to society (often called its "shadow price"). For example, 
suppose a particular air pollutant damages crops. One of the benefits of 
controlling that pollutant will be the value of the crop saved as a result of the 
controls. That value would typically be determined by reference to the price of 
the crop. If, however, the price of that crop is held above the unregulated market 
equilibrium price by a government price-support program, an estimate based on 
the support price would overstate the value of the benefit of controlling the 
pollutant. . . .  
 
In other cases, market prices could understate social values, for example 
where production of a particular good also provides opportunities for improving 
basic knowledge. 
 
3. Principles for Valuing Benefits That Are Indirectly Traded in Markets.  . 
. . 
 
A variety of methods have been developed for estimating indirectly 
traded benefits. Generally, these methods apply statistical techniques to distill 
from observable market transactions the portion of willingness-to-pay that can 
be attributed to the benefit in question. Examples include estimates of the value 
of environmental amenities derived from travel-cost studies, hedonic price 
models that measure differences or changes in the value of land, and statistical 
studies of occupational-risk premiums in wage rates. For all these methods, care 73  Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
is needed in designing protocols for reliably estimating benefits or in adapting 
the results of previous studies to new applications. The use of occupational-risk 
premiums can be a source of bias because the risks, when recognized, may be 
voluntarily rather than involuntarily assumed, and the sample of individuals 
upon which premium estimates are based may be skewed toward more risk-
tolerant people. 
 
Contingent-valuation methods have become increasingly common for 
estimating indirectly traded benefits, but the reliance of these methods on 
hypothetical scenarios and the complexities of the goods being valued by this 
technique raise issues about its accuracy in estimating willingness to pay 
compared to methods based on (indirect) revealed preferences. Accordingly, 
value estimates derived from contingent-valuation studies require greater 
analytical care than studies based on observable behavior. For example, the 
contingent valuation instrument must portray a realistic choice situation for 
respondents -- where the hypothetical choice situation corresponds closely with 
the policy context to which the estimates will be applied. The practice of 
contingent valuation is rapidly evolving, and agencies relying upon this tool for 
valuation should judge the reliability of their benefit estimates using this 
technique in light of advances in the state of the art. 
 
4. Principles and Methods for Valuing Goods That Are Not Traded  
 
Directly or Indirectly in Markets. Some types of goods, such as preserving 
environmental or cultural amenities apart from their use and direct enjoyment by 
people, are not traded directly or indirectly in markets. The practical obstacles to 
accurate measurement are similar to (but generally more severe than) those 
arising with respect to indirect benefits, principally because there are few or no 
related market transactions to provide data for willingness-to-pay estimates. 
 
For many of these goods, particularly goods providing "nonuse" values, 
contingent-valuation methods may provide the only analytical approaches 
currently available for estimating values. The absence of observable and 
replicable behavior with respect to the good in question, combined with the 
complex and often unfamiliar nature of the goods being valued, argues for great 
care in the design and execution of surveys, rigorous analysis of the results, and 
a full characterization of the uncertainties in the estimates to meet best practices 
in the use of this method. 
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 (b) Fatality risks. . . . 
 
Reductions in fatality risks as a result of government action are best 
monetized according to the willingness-to-pay approach.  . . . Another way of 
expressing reductions in fatality risks is in terms of the "value of statistical life-
years extended" (VSLY). For example, if a regulation protected individuals 
whose average remaining life expectancy was 40 years, then a risk reduction of 
one fatality would be expressed as 40 life-years extended. This approach allows 
distinctions in risk-reduction measures based on their effects on longevity. 
However, this does not automatically mean that regulations with greater 
numbers of life-years extended will be favored over regulations with fewer 
numbers of life-years extended. VSL and VSLY ultimately depend on the 
willingness to pay for various forms of mortality risk reduction, not just 
longevity considerations. 
 
. . . 
 
To value reductions in more voluntarily incurred risks (e.g., those related 
to motorcycling without a helmet) that are "high," agencies should consider 
using lower values than those applied to reductions in involuntary risk. When a 
higher-risk option is chosen voluntarily, those who assume the risk may be more 
risk-tolerant, i.e., they may place a relatively lower value on avoiding risks. 
Empirical studies of risk premiums in higher-risk occupations suggest that 
reductions in risks for voluntarily assumed high risk jobs (e.g., above 10-4 
annually) are valued less than equal risk reductions for lower-risk jobs. 
However, when occupational choices are limited, the occupational risks incurred 
may be more involuntary in nature. 
 
C. Cost Estimates . . . 
 
As with benefit estimates, the calculation of costs should reflect the full 
probability distribution of potential consequences. Extreme values should be 
weighted, along with other possible outcomes, by estimates of their probability 
of occurrence based on the available evidence to estimate the expected result of a 
proposed regulation. If fundamental scientific disagreement or lack of 
knowledge precludes construction of a scientifically defensible probability 
distribution, costs should be described under plausible alternative assumptions, 
along with a characterization of the evidence underlying each alternative view.  . 
. . 
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